Port security in the Persian Gulf by Munson, Mark B.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2008-06
Port security in the Persian Gulf
Munson, Mark B.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 








 Thesis Advisor:         Daniel Moran 
 Second Reader:       James Russell 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2008 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
Port Security in the Persian Gulf 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Mark Munson 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT  
 
The United States and the international community have implemented numerous measures since 2001 
designed to improve the security of maritime commerce.  Special attention has been paid to the vulnerability of port 
facilities to exploitation by terrorists or other illicit actors.  While the implementation of enhanced port security 
measures in Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iraq may have improved some aspects of maritime security, significant 
vulnerabilities remain.  While strong physical security at ports and stringent inspection regimes for container cargo 
are important elements in protecting maritime infrastructure worldwide, port security measures may yet be 
undermined by a failure to provide mechanisms which verify the identities and credentials of all individuals with 
access to ports, secure non-container cargo, and prevent illicit actors from accessing and exploiting port facilities. 
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
93 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
port security, ISPS, CSI, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, maritime infrastructure, IMO, port 
facility, terrorism, smuggling, oil, fuel, Persian Gulf, Arabian Gulf, Middle East 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
PORT SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF 
 
Mark B. Munson 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., The College of William and Mary, 1997 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  

























Harold A. Trinkunas 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The United States and the international community have implemented numerous 
measures since 2001 designed to improve the security of maritime commerce.  Special 
attention has been paid to the vulnerability of port facilities to exploitation by terrorists or 
other illicit actors.  While the implementation of enhanced port security measures in 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iraq may have improved some aspects of maritime security, 
significant vulnerabilities remain.  While strong physical security at ports and stringent 
inspection regimes for container cargo are important elements in protecting maritime 
infrastructure worldwide, port security measures may yet be undermined by a failure to 
provide mechanisms which verify the identities and credentials of all individuals with 
access to ports, secure non-container cargo, and prevent illicit actors from accessing and 
exploiting port facilities. 
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 The United States and the international community have implemented numerous 
measures since 2001 designed to improve the security of maritime commerce.  Special 
attention has been paid to the vulnerability of port facilities to exploitation by terrorists or 
other illicit actors.  The International Maritime Organization (IMO) ratified the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in 2002, and called for member 
states to implement the code by 2004.  U.S. legislation such as the 2002 Maritime 
Transportation Safety Act (MTSA), and the 2006 Security and Accountability for Every 
Port Act (SAFE Port), although designed primarily to enhance national maritime security, 
both have international components designed to improve security at facilities through 
which U.S.-bound goods travel. 
 This thesis demonstrates how these port security measures have been 
implemented in Persian Gulf ports.  While they have improved some aspects of maritime 
security, these port security measures have failed to address significant vulnerabilities 
which terrorists or other illicit actors may be able to exploit.  While strong physical 
security at ports and stringent inspection regimes for container cargo are important 
elements in protecting maritime infrastructure worldwide, port security measures can be 
undermined by a failure to provide mechanisms which verify the identities and 
credentials of all individuals with access to ports, secure non-container cargo, and prevent 
illicit actors from accessing and exploiting port facilities.   
Many observers in the international maritime community expressed concerns 
regarding the potential economic impact of ISPS and the U.S. measures when first 
ratified and implemented, fearing that shippers would be forced to ultimately bear the 
burden of the costs associated with implementing them, and that poor states, unable to 
pay for their facilities to comply with the new standards, would see risk-averse shippers 
direct their traffic elsewhere.  The data associated with the three case studies addressed in 
this thesis neither validates nor disproves that prediction.  Ports in Saudi Arabia, UAE, 
 2
and Iraq have experienced increases in maritime trade since the implementation of ISPS 
and the various U.S.-led programs, as well as significant investment by the state (or the 
coalition, in the case of Iraq) or state-owned firms in port security programs.  Whether 
that increased traffic resulted from enhanced port security, happened in spite of enhanced 
security, or was unrelated and caused by other economic factors is a question deserving 
additional research and scrutiny. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
 Since 2001, international agreements such as the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code (an amendment to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 
(SOLAS), as well as U.S. legislation such as the 2002 Maritime Transportation Safety 
Act (MTSA), and the 2006 Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE-Port), 
have been implemented in order to protect maritime infrastructure from terrorism and 
illicit activity.  While the primary aim of the U.S. initiatives has been the protection of 
the U.S. itself from terrorism, the inclusion of multiple programs in MTSA and SAFE-
Port addressing non-U.S. ports demonstrates a realization that, due to the interdependent 
nature of maritime commerce, security standards and practices must be effectively 
implemented both internationally and domestically to prove effective.  Terrorists could 
theoretically exploit any unprotected port on the globe through which U.S.-bound cargo 
travels in order to carry out an attack.   
 While the U.S. has taken the lead in encouraging improved international port 
security, these measures are primarily motivated by a fear of attack against United States 
territory.  The actual success and impacts of these multilateral and supranational 
programs, however, remains relatively unexamined.  It is not entirely clear whether these 
measures effectively "solve" the problem of vulnerable ports.  Although numerous 
authors and think-tanks have generated an abundance of hypothetical worst-case 
scenarios which depict shipping containers being used to move materials, weapons, 
manpower, etc., for use in a potential terrorist attacks, there has been no serious and 
exhaustive analysis of exactly how terrorists can exploit ports, and whether state or 
international regulation can realistically stop terrorists from using them.  In addition, 
there has been little debate over the international impact of possible attacks against ports, 
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or the precise manners in which ports or maritime infrastructure can be exploited by illicit 
actors or networks.  Rather than improving port security worldwide, programs such as 
ISPS may possibly alter global trade by creating a two-tiered system of secure and 
insecure ports supporting completely separate global economies.  An assessment of port 
security in Persian Gulf ports may provide insight into whether the various post-2001 
maritime security measures have made the world safer from terrorism, or are simply 
cosmetic alterations that fall short of fully addressing the complex security requirements 
of global maritime trade.  
C. POST-2001 MARITIME REGULATIONS 
1. ISPS and Other International Programs 
 The International Maritime Organization (IMO, the UN agency responsible for 
regulating global maritime activity) drafted the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS), a series of amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea 
Convention (SOLAS), in 2002 as a response to the threat of terrorism to international 
maritime commerce.  ISPS consists of mandatory "security-related requirements for 
Governments, port authorities and shipping companies," "non-mandatory" guidelines for 
those requirements, and "a series of resolutions designed to add weight to the 
amendments, encourage the application of the measures to ships and port facilities not 
covered by the Code and pave the way for future work on the subject."1   
 ISPS calls for the development of "minimum functional security requirements for 
ships and port facilities."  Ships (and ship owners) are required to implement ship 
security plans, designate ship security officers, company security officers, and install 
onboard equipment (including the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and the Ship 
Security Alert System (SSAS)).  Ports are required to implement port facility security 
plans, identify port facility security officers, as well as install their own security 
equipment.  Both ships and port facilities are required to develop plans to assist the 
                                                 
1 "IMO adopts comprehensive maritime security measures," International Maritime Organization, 
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=583&doc_id=2689 (accessed September 12, 
2007). 
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monitoring and controlling access to ships and ports, monitoring the activities of people 
and cargo, and ensuring the availability of appropriate security communications.  Due to 
the "different risks" faced by different ships and ports, the states signing the agreement 
are responsible for ensuring compliance with these measures as they deem appropriate.2  
Under SOLAS, "there is no remit under the Convention for IMO as a body to monitor 
compliance," but rather "provides for individual Contracting Governments to adopt the 
rules into their own national legislation."3  ISPS took effect on 1 July 2004. 
 ISPS has inspired other international agreements designed to address additional 
aspects of maritime security.  In response to the need identified by the drafters of ISPS 
for secure, standardized documents to be issued to the world's merchant seamen, another 
arm of the UN, the International Labour Organization (ILO), drafted the Revised 
Seafarer’s Identity Documents Convention in 2003.  This convention called for the 
development of globally standardized documents that would be impossible to counterfeit 
or falsify, provide biometric identification of document-holders, and yet be cheap enough 
that they would "be generally accessible to governments at the lowest cost."  Concerns 
for minimizing the costs associated with producing such documents were reflected in 
ILO's mandate that the "the equipment needed for the provision and verification of the 
biometric is user-friendly and is generally accessible to governments at low cost."  Like 
ISPS, responsibility for enforcement of the convention is the sole responsibility of the 
signatory states, including the issuing of documents, verification of the qualifications of 
individuals receiving the documents, and maintaining a "national electronic database" of 
its citizens who are licensed merchant seamen.4  This is problematic because, unlike 
ISPS, which has been almost universally ratified by states worldwide, the Revised 
Seafarer's Identity Documents Convention has been ratified by only thirteen states,5 and 
                                                 
2 "IMO adopts comprehensive maritime security measures." 
3 Ibid. 
4 "C185 Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003," International Labour 
Organization, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C185 (accessed March 11, 2008). 
5 The convention has been ratified by Albania, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, France, Hungary, Jordan, South 
Korea, Lithuania, Madagascar, Moldova, Nigeria, Pakistan, Vanuata, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/ratifce.pl?C185 (accessed March 11, 2008). 
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the states whose citizens form the bulk of the world's merchant seamen are also among 
the poorest.  The five states with the five most merchant seamen in the world are the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Turkey, China, and India.6  It seems naive to expect that these 
states will graciously accept the burden of taking the lead in paying for and developing 
effective biometric identity documents for a particularly impoverished portion of their 
workforce. 
2. MTSA (2002) and SAFE-Port (2006) 
 The two primary pieces of legislation enacted by the U.S. government designed to 
improve maritime security are the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA, 
Public Law 107-295) and the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 
(SAFE Port Act, Public Law 109-347).  MTSA implemented the ISPS code for the U.S., 
as well additional security measures.  The SAFE Port Act enacted further programs 
designed to improve maritime security, and codified several other initiatives that had 
been implemented since 2001 by U.S. government agencies. 
 MTSA "is designed to protect the nation’s ports and waterways from a terrorist 
attack," by "requiring completion of security assessments, development of security plans, 
and implementation of security measures and procedures."  By using a "risk-based 
methodology, the security regulations focus on those sectors of maritime industry that 
have a higher risk of involvement in a transportation security incident."7 
 In addition to the measures implemented through MTSA, the SAFE Port Act calls 
for additional security enhancements, some of the more significant being the creation of 
the "Transportation Worker Identification Credential," a universal, counterfeit-proof 
document issued to individuals with access to ports,8 the Container Security Initiative 
(CSI), and the "Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism" (C-TPAT).9  CSI and C-
                                                 
6 Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact, OECD Directorate for Science, 
Technology, and Industry: Maritime Transport Committee (2003), 46. 
7 Protecting America's Ports: Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (July 1, 2003), 3. 
8 Secure Seas, Open Ports: Keeping our Waters Safe, Secure, and Open for Business, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security (June 21, 2004), 9. 
9 Secure Seas, Open Ports: Keeping our Waters Safe, Secure, and Open for Business, 5. 
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TPAT are designed to enhance U.S. maritime security by securing  the interconnected 
"Global Supply Chain," effectively protecting the U.S. homeland by enhancing the 
security of global transportation infrastructure. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Regulating global commerce requires a delicate balancing act between the means 
and capabilities of states, supranational actors, and commercial interests.  Historically, 
states have often only consented to "international prohibition regimes" when faced with 
"the inadequacy of unilateral and bilateral law enforcement measures in the face of 
criminal activities that that transcend national borders."10  There are instances, however, 
when positive instead of negative incentives can drive compliance with these sorts of 
regimes.  This may be true in the realm of port security, as "governments have an 
incentive to cooperate with the inspections because it means that cargo shipped from their 
ports will face no extra delays upon arrival."11  "International trade corridor security," is 
not necessarily all encompassing, however.  To be truly effective, it must balance 
commercial and security concerns in a process of "credible risk management."12  The 
tension between commercial interests and the security needs of states was exemplified 
during the negotiation of ISPS when the maritime industry’s conceded "the need for new 
safeguards," but still emphasized that "increased security could not impede daily 
operations."13  Achieving the appropriate balance between security and profitability is 
difficult in the maritime world, however, for it is the "very things which have allowed 
maritime transport to contribute to economic prosperity" which "render it uniquely 
vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist groups."14 
                                                 
10 Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International 
Society," International Organization 44 (Autumn 1990): 481.  
11 Peter Andreas, "Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century," 
International Security 28 (Fall 2003): 99. 
12 Lisa H. Harrington, "Can We Secure International Trade?" Transportation & Distribution 43 
(November, 2002): 54. 
13 Jared Wade, "Maritime Security." Risk Management 52 (December 1, 2005): 41.  
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed March 12, 2008). 
14 Alexandros M. Goulielmos and Agisilaos A Anastasakos, "Worldwide security measures for 
shipping, seafarers and ports: An impact assessment of ISPS code." Disaster Prevention and Management 
14 (August 10, 2005): 472.  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed March 12, 2008).  
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 Both ISPS and unilateral U.S. efforts represent significant developments in the 
evolution of global maritime commerce.  The ISPS code has been called the "most 
important global security initiative ever, with impacts affecting the entire international 
shipping industry and beyond."15  ISPS has even changed the language of maritime 
commerce.  Due to its lack of jurisdiction over actual "ports," the IMO was forced to 
create "the term "port facility" to refer to areas where a vessel covered by SOLAS 
receives services."16  The U.S. approach represents a similar revision to previously 
accepted notions of what a port is, and what security there entails, attempting to "raise 
standards by working within the maritime transportation industry and local port 
authorities, while pressuring major trading partners to consent to the harmonization of 
international law enforcement strategies, resources, and support systems."17 
 Despite the potentially revolutionary implications of ISPS and other post-2001 
programs, port security encompasses much more than the physical protection of the 
facilities themselves, and it is not clear whether these measures address those broader 
concerns.  "Port facilities represent a more complex issue, considering the difficulty of 
controlling such a large volume of traffic, personnel and cargo inspection and expensive, 
recurring issues such as waterside security."18  While ISPS may successfully protect 
"international shipping against physical terrorist attacks," it ignores other, non-seaborne 
or pier-side "vulnerabilities associated with information systems and technology."19  In  
                                                 
15 Khalid Bichou, "The ISPS Code and The Cost of Port Compliance: An Initial Logistics and Supply 
Chain Framework for Port Security Assessment and Management." Maritime Economics & Logistics 6 
(December 1, 2004): 323.  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed March 12, 2008).  
16 Keith Nuthall, Philip Fine and Jonathan Thomson. "IMO sets course for port security." Security 
Management, April 1, 2003, 84-87.  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed March 12, 
2008). 
17 Jessica Romero, "Prevention of Maritime Terrorism: The Container Security Initiative." Chicago 
Journal of International Law 4 (October 1, 2003): 603.  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ 
(accessed March 12, 2008). 
18 Robert Botelho, "Maritime Security: Implications And Solutions." Sea Technology, March 1, 2004, 
18.  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed March 12, 2008). 
19 Shashi K. Shah, "The Evolving Landscape of Maritime Cybersecurity." Review of Business 25 
(October 1, 2004): 32.  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed March 12, 2008). 
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their model of a port's "security cycle," C. Ariel Pinto and Wayne K. Talley differentiated 
three different categories for "potential port security incidents:" "waterside, landside, 
employee and information-release related."20 
 While some authors claim that measures such as ISPS and CSI have been 
successful because the maritime "industry feels the U.S. government has done a good job 
of balancing industry’s business concerns and the need for improved supply chain 
security,"21 much of the literature identifies flaws within these programs.  Pointing out 
IMO's inability to enforce the mandates of ISPS, other authors have derided ISPS 
because "compliance lies largely in the eye of the beholder," and that "each nation is 
allowed to determine whether its vessels or port facilities are up to par."22   
The actual implementation of these programs was challenging, with only 53% of 
ships and ports possessing the mandatory "officially approved security plans" when ISPS 
came into effect in 2004.23 Although "89.5 per cent of over 9,000 declared port facilities 
had had their Port Facility Security Plans approved" soon after by August 2004, this 
perception of poor compliance with the spirit of ISPS continued as "400 masters and ship 
security officers" claimed in a survey that they had seen " no noticeable improvement in 
security measures since the introduction of the ISPS Code."24  Although its is probably 
unfair to blame them solely on the shortcomings of ISPS, piracy incidents also increased 
after implementation in 2004.25 
 The new system also may have disturbed the delicate balance between security 
and commerce, particularly by increasing the costs of shipping.  A report commissioned 
                                                 
20 C. Ariel Pinto and Wayne K. Talley. "The Security Incident Cycle of Ports." Maritime Economics & 
Logistics 8 (September 1, 2006): 270.  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed March 12, 
2008). 
21 Marc Thibault, Mary R. Brooks, and Kenneth J. Button, "The Response of the U.S. Maritime 
Industry to the New Container Security Initiatives." Transportation Journal 45 (January 1, 2006): 13.  
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed March 12, 2008). 
22 Stephen E. Flynn, "The morning-after problem." Journal of Commerce, January 8, 2007, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed March 12, 2008). 
23 "Perils on the sea," Economist.com / Global Agenda, July 7, 2004, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed March 12, 2008). 
24 Lynda Davies, "New Maritime Security Measures Not all Plain Sailing," Technical Review Middle 
East, January, 2005. 
25 Dale Ferriere, "Carrot or stick?" Journal of Commerce, August 7, 2006, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed March 12, 2008). 
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by the OECD downplayed this fear, however, arguing "the extent of their costs is 
uncertain but is likely to be much less than the extent of costs linked to inaction."26  The 
perception of how burdensome those costs may be probably reflects the degree to 
whether a port or state sees itself as a terrorist target.  Despite the excessive costs that 
would result from a successful attack against an important component of maritime trade 
such as oil transport, some observers feel that "ports and shipping lines" have been 
"dragging their feet on complying" with the new and expensive security measures, 
feeling that other ports are the real targets for terrorists while they are safe.27  In addition, 
these regulations may be changing "shipping patterns" and the "international shipping 
environment."  Some feel that the "costly information sharing and exchange" as well as 
"the privacy protection pitfalls" associated with these programs are so burdensome, that 
the world needs to develop an alternative approach to maritime security than the current 
U.S.-led approach.28  Ultimately, critics allege that "U.S. and international initiatives 
have added rules, procedures, and technology to improve security without changing the 
underlying ways that people enter and operate within the maritime system."29  This is of 
particular concern in the developing world, where the implementation of ISPS may have 
been hampered by "a lack of technical infrastructure, expertise, and know-how."30  
Revelations by the governments of India and Kenya in 2007 that both states still needed 
to improve port security has been seen by some as an admission that neither states' ports 
actually met ISPS security standards when they announced compliance in 2004.31  Of 
course the manner in which ISPS has been implemented may be irrelevant, if terrorists or 
criminals choose to obey the new regulations while using the sea for their own gain.  It is 
                                                 
26 Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact, 56. 
27 "Perils on the Sea." 
28 Dinos Stasinopoulos, "Maritime Security - The Need for a Global Agreement." Maritime 
Economics & Logistics 5 (September 1, 2003): 318.  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed 
March 12, 2008). 
29 John R. Harrald, "SEA TRADE AND SECURITY: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POST-9/11 
REACTION," Journal of International Affairs 59 (October 1, 2005): 175.  
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed March 12, 2008). 
30 Container Security: Major Initiatives and Related International Developments.  United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 2004. 
31 Frank Kennedy, "Port ISPS Compliance Remains Problematic," Gulfnews.Com, October 14, 2007, 
http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/10/15/10160260.html (accessed October 23, 2007). 
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precisely the maritime gray-zone between the state and the international system in which 
illicit maritime actors operate, having "learned to work without the need for a home base 
and, more significantly, to escape the forces of order not by running away, but complying 
with the laws and regulations in order to move freely and to hide in plain sight."32  
 Relatively few studies of the impacts of this generation of maritime security 
programs have been published to date.  One commissioned by the government of 
Malaysia after the code's drafting predicted that ISPS would increase costs for all parties 
involved in shipping, including governments, ports, and shippers, due to the new costs 
required for training, insurance, and operations.33  Another focusing on the Caribbean 
assessed that the "adoption and implementation of the ISPS Code has been difficult and 
expensive for ports and shipping lines," but that ports had become more productive after 
ISPS implementation, probably due to a reduction in theft, better training for security 
personnel, and improved coordination between shippers and ports.34  One study 
encompassing several major ports across the globe offered a similar outlook, arguing that 
the costs associated with implementation would "be resolved with time," particularly if 
accompanied by a renewed emphasis from the international maritime community on the 
need for a "standardized biometric identification card," and increased global awareness of 
"the benefits of compliance."35 
 In 2007 the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) published an 
assessment of the global impacts of ISPS.  According to the 55 ports (mostly "in 
developed countries") surveyed by UNCTAD, "full compliance seems to have been 
achieved with no major difficulties," with the "initial costs" of implementation between 
$3,000-35,000 per port, and with "annual costs" between $1,000 and $19,000 per port, 
with equipment accounting for the bulk of the initial costs, and personnel accounting for 
                                                 
32 William Langewiesche, The Outlaw Sea (New York: North Point Press, 2004): 7. 
33 Noor Apandi Osnin and Syahriman Baharom Shah, MIMA Information Paper: The Implications of 
the ISPS Code for Malaysia.  Centre for Ocean Law and Policy, Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA), 
2003, 7. 
34 Linda T. Babins, "Measuring the Impacts of Increased Security on Ports and Shipping in the 
Caribbean Basin." (Master of Arts, Public Policy & Public Administration, Concordia University, 2006), 
iii, 68. 
35 Port and Supply-Chain Security Initiatives in the United States and Abroad (Austin, Texas: Lyndon 
B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, the University of Texas at Austin, 2006), 55. 
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a majority of the recurring annual costs.36  Globally, costs ranged "between US$ 1.1 
billion and US$ 2.3 billion initially and approximately US$ 0.4 billion and US$ 0.9 
billion annually thereafter," the "equivalent to increases in international maritime freight 
payments of about 1% with respect to the initial expenditure and 0.5% with respect to the 
annual expenditure."37  According to the survey, the majority of ISPS costs had been paid 
for by a combination of security charges levied by ports, or state-provided "public 
funding and assistance."  Despite some negative impressions by ports regarding 
"operational interferences, as well as cost implications and related funding 
requirements,"38 the overall impacts of ISPS in terms of trade seem positive.  The 
majority of ports surveyed reported either an increase or no change in the areas of 
Competitiveness, Efficiency, Throughput, the use of "Information and Communication 
Technologies," Delays, and Theft.39 
E. METHODOLOGY 
 The Persian Gulf provides numerous examples of maritime activity and port 
facilities that both comply and do not comply with ISPS or U.S. programs under MTSA 
and SAFE-Port.  Ports in UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq demonstrate the wide spectrum of 
maritime commerce and port security measures designed to combat illicit activity.  That 
spectrum ranges from the large tankers and offshore oil facilities that play a critical role 
in global energy markets, to the small dhows carrying a variety of cheap (and often 
smuggled) consumer goods.  While most of these ports claim full compliance with post-
2002 security measures, the diverse maritime environment of the region offers useful 
comparisons and similarities between the most "primitive" ports and "modern" ones fully 
integrated into the global system. 
 The Saudi government proclaimed that all of its port facilities were fully in 
compliance with the ISPS code before the 2004 deadline.  As the leading petroleum 
                                                 
36 Maritime Security: ISPS Code Implementation, Costs and Related Financing.  United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 2007, 5. 
37 Ibid., 6. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 24-26. 
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exporting state in the world, and faced by an indigenous Al Qaeda threat, the security of 
its maritime oil infrastructure is critical to both the Saudi state and the entire global 
economy.  The ability of the Saudi government to ensure the security of Persian Gulf 
ports such as Ras Tanura, its primary crude oil and LPG export terminal, as well as 
whether those efforts resulted from international or internal pressure, may measure the 
effectiveness of these regulations.  While increased awareness of the potential impacts of 
seaborne terrorism has led the Saudis to invest heavily in maritime security, and not 
necessarily in direct response to the drafting of the ISPS Code, several maritime 
vulnerabilities remain in the Kingdom.  The potential for infiltration of Saudi security 
forces or its oil industry by Al Qaeda sympathizers or operatives, and upheavals in the 
security forces tasked with securing coastal Saudi oil infrastructure may undermine the 
hundreds of millions of dollars that the Saudi government has thrown at the problem. 
 UAE is the maritime hub of the Persian Gulf.  Port facilities in Dubai both 
participate in CSI and host port calls of U.S. naval vessels.  UAE has also pioneered a 
system of Free Trade Zones and ports that play a crucial role in the economic life of the 
region.  Ports in the Emirates of Ajman, Sharjah, (both adjacent to Dubai) and Fujairah 
(on the Arabian Sea) dominate both the trade of consumer goods to the Iraqi ports opened 
after the fall of Saddam Hussein, as well as the trade of smuggled or resold fuels from 
Iraq (just as they dominated the trade in oil smuggled from Iraq during the period of UN 
sanctions).  UAE’s success or failure in maintaining a schizophrenic maritime system 
characterized by highly regulated and security conscious ports complying with measures 
such as ISPS and CSI, as well as laissez-faire ports characterized by much more informal 
and often illegal trade, may provide useful lessons into whether international security 
regulations work, and their impact on pre-existing transnational commercial networks.  
Large UAE ports such as Jebel Ali are among the world's leaders in modern port 
operations, and are the industry leaders in port security standards and practices.  If these 
ports are not protected from terror by the implementation of rigorous security measures, 
then few ports anywhere in the world are safe from potential attack.  The co-location of  
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highly regulated international trade and smaller, traditional forms of dhow-borne 
commerce may provide an opportunity for illicit entry into the global supply chain, 
however.   
 Iraq’s ports and maritime infrastructure are key sources of wealth and serve as 
vital connections to the global economy.  Since 2003 both Iraqi and coalition leaders 
have realized that the restoration of Iraqi port facilities to their full capability (they have 
been the victims of neglect and targets of military attack since the Iran-Iraq War) is 
critical to Iraq’s reconstruction, and attempts have been made to bring them up to 
international standards.  However, the opportunities for patronage, graft, and smuggling 
available to those who control them have made ports such as Umm Qasr and Abu Flus, as 
well as the offshore oil terminals, the objects of much inter-party competition (and 
violence).  The manner in which Iraq’s ports become either a tool supporting national 
economic regeneration (by full incorporation into the global maritime economy) or 
simply fiefdoms for competing militias, can demonstrate whether international initiatives 
such as ISPS make the world’s ports safer, or actually create a two-tiered maritime 
economy by excluding states incapable of ISPS compliance.  To date, despite not 
complying with ISPS, Iraqi ports have implemented a variety of improvements to port 
security, primarily as part of wider coalition reconstruction efforts.  Despite the 2004 
attack against an Iraqi oil platform in the northern Persian Gulf, pervasive violence in 
Iraq since the 2003 coalition invasion, and widespread militia infiltration of the ports and 
Iraqi security services tasked with protecting them, maritime trade in Iraq has been brisk, 
likely reflecting Iraq's opening to the world after being shut out of the global marketplace 
by war and sanctions for so long.  Iraq's ports retain several vulnerabilities to terrorism, 
but the success of Iraqi ports in spite of widespread chaos seems to reflect that at least 
some shippers will sail into danger when potential profits outweigh the risks. 
 In much the same way that Pinto and Talley differentiated port security incidents 
into waterside, landside, and employee or information-release related categories, this 
thesis attempts to measure port security along four different lines.  The first category, 
Identity and Credential Verification, involves the ability for a port to regulate the entry of 
individuals and cargo into the facility.  If a port is unable to prevent unauthorized 
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personnel or cargo from traveling through its confines, it is not secure, regardless of 
whether such a phenomenon occurs due to lax physical security, the widespread 
availability of counterfeit documents, or other factors.  The second category, Supply 
Chain and Cargo Security, involves the ability for port officials to know what cargo is 
traveling through the port, their ability to identify illicit cargo, and their ability to inspect 
potentially illicit cargo.  The third category, Physical Security, encompasses more than 
just the fence around a port.  It also encompasses the capabilities of agencies, firms, or 
individuals tasked with keeping the port secure, and includes both landside and waterside 
security.  The fourth category, Illicit Use of Ports, involves the ability of the port to 
prevent illegal access or exploitation of the port's resources.  These illicit activities could 
be accomplished by individuals or groups that have snuck into the port, or involve crimes 
committed by people with legal access to the facility.  If dockworkers, customs officials, 
or law enforcement are using their access to steal, smuggle, or collect bribes, then a port 
is not secure.   
Implementing programs that address these vulnerabilities may prove costly, and 
the ultimate impact of these particular vulnerabilities on security may vary.  Programs 
designed to scan cargo for radioactive materials may be more likely to directly prevent 
the shipment of a "dirty bomb" than an anti-corruption campaign, and may therefore 
seem a more cost effective way to prevent a high-profile terror act.  Such an assessment 
ignores that all aspects of security are interlinked in ports, however.  Ignoring one aspect 
imperils the success of measures addressing another factor, by providing vulnerabilities 
that illicit actors can use to circumvent those measures.  A strong fence around a port 
with only one gate is not particularly useful if terrorists can bribe their way in, or have 
already infiltrated the security service protecting the facility. 
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II. SAUDI ARABIA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The security concerns surrounding Saudi maritime infrastructure are unique both 
because of the prominence of oil exports in Saudi maritime trade, and the presence of an 
indigenous terrorist threat in the form of Al-Qaeda militants in Saudi Arabia (often 
referred to as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), who have attacked oil targets, and may 
have some intent of striking directly at Saudi petroleum export facilities.  The Saudi 
government declared that all Saudi ports had fully complied with ISPS-mandated port 
security measures in 2004.  Both the Saudi government and the national oil company, 
Saudi Aramco, claim to have invested massive resources in order to ensure the security of 
vital infrastructure.  It is unclear, however, whether large expenditures on security 
personnel and equipment provide the best mechanisms for protection against potential 
Al-Qaeda attacks.  Saudi ports may still be vulnerable to infiltration from within by 
potential terrorists joining the various security forces, or the potential incompetence of 
those security personnel.  On the other hand, however, the impacts of potential attacks 
may not be as bad as some of the doomsday scenarios painted by analysts convinced that 
global economic collapse would certainly follow a significant attack.  While the 
effectiveness of Saudi port security is debatable, there have been no successful maritime 
attacks against Saudi ports to date.  Similarly, while the economic impacts of enhancing 
Saudi port security are unclear (particularly in terms of hindering or encouraging trade 
through increasing costs or decreasing theft), and it is difficult to isolate the effects of 
new port security measures from other factors, such as record-high oil prices and other 
macroeconomic effects, as port throughput at Saudi ports has increased since ISPS 
implementation.  
B. PORT OVERVIEW (SAUDI AND ARAMCO PORTS) 
 The major Saudi port facilities on the Persian Gulf include several operated by the 
Saudi Ports Authority (SPA), clustered around the cities of Jubail, Dammam, and Khobar 
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in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.  They include King Abdulaziz Port in Dammam and 
King Fahd Industrial Port in Jubail.  Of particular interest is King Fahd in Jubail, which 
accounts for almost a third of total SPA port throughput, three-quarters of which is liquid 
bulk cargo, primarily petrochemicals and LPG.40  
 Petroleum exports shipped through Saudi Aramco-controlled ports are also 
significant.  After Saudi oil is pumped from fields in the Eastern Province, it is processed 
at nearby facilities and then exported in a variety of forms.  A pipeline connects the fields 
and "petrochemical complex" of the Eastern Province to the export terminals on the Red 
Sea at Yanbu, and on the Persian Gulf at Ras Tanura and Ju’aymah.  Estimates of the 
amount of oil pumped and exported from Saudi Arabia are huge, as "80% of the near 9m 
barrels of oil a day pumped out by Saudi is believed to end up being piped from fields 
such as Ghawar to Ras Tanura in the Gulf to be loaded on to supertankers bound for the 
west,"41 and that "a tenth of global oil supply flows daily" through the Ras Tanura and 
Ju’aymah facilities on the Persian Gulf.42  The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that 
Ras Tanura and Ju’aymah can export approximately 6 million barrels of crude oil a day 
(2.5 million at Ras Tanura itself, another 3.5 million at Ju’aymah).43  The operations on 
the Gulf are massive, as the "(p)ipelines from six oil fields feed into the terminals and to 
several tank farms housing some of the biggest oil storage vessels ever built."44 
 The Ras Tanura export facility (which includes the South Pier, the North Pier, and 
the Sea Islands) contains eighteen berths, the largest of which are "designed to serve up 
to 500,000 deadweight ton (DWT) tankers," and can handle "Arab crude oil, refined 
                                                 
40 "All Saudi Ports Comply with ISPS Code," Saudi Ports Authority, 
http://www.ports.gov.sa/section/full_story.cfm?aid=250 (accessed January 10, 2008).  According to the 
Saudi Ports Authority, Saudi Ports (excluding Aramco-controlled ports) handled 134 million DWT of cargo 
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DWT was liquid bulk cargo. 
41 Terry Macalister, "Once Seen as an Alarmist Fear, an Attack on Key Saudi Oil Terminal could 
Destabilise West," The Guardian, June 3, 2004, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/oil/story/0,11319,1230311,00.html (accessed October 11, 2007). 
42 Gal Luft, "Terror’s Next Target?" The Journal of International Security Affairs 6 (Winter 2004): 96. 
43 Country Analysis Briefs: Saudi Arabia (Washington, DC: Energy Information Administration, 
February 2007), www.eia.doe.gov (accessed October 15, 2007). 
44 Kim Murphy, "WAR WITH IRAQ / LAW AND ORDER; Saudis Tighten Oil Security; War or no 
war, the industry is an obvious and vulnerable terrorist target, experts warn [HOME EDITION]," Los 
Angeles Times, April 18, 2003, http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed January 10, 2008). 
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products and RLPG (Refrigerated Liquefied Petroleum Gas)." The nearby Ju’aymah 
facility is also substantial, with another six berths able to handle vessels up to 750,000 
DWT.  Ju’aymah also has another sea island with two RLPG berths.45  Some analysts 
feel that the maze of causeways, pipelines, underwater hoses/lines, and walkways 
connecting these coastal and offshore facilities present an inviting target to terrorists 
wishing to strike at a critical node of the interconnected global economy.  In accordance 
with that threat, and increased concern for the security of critical global infrastructure of 
all sorts, the Saudi Ministry of Transportation announced on 13 June 2004 that all ports 
operated by the Saudi Ports Authority or Saudi Aramco had complied with the provisions 
of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), and had "approved Port 
Facility Assessments and Port Facility Security Plans."46 
C. TERRORISM AND SAUDI ARABIA 
 Usama bin Laden has clearly expressed Al-Qaeda’s (AQ) desire to attack oil 
infrastructure in order to strike at the United States economy: 
Targeting America in Iraq in terms of economy and loss of life is a golden and 
unique opportunity…One of the most important reasons that our enemies control 
our land is the pilfering of our oil…prevent them from getting the oil and conduct 
your operations accordingly, particularly in Iraq and the gulf.47 
 
Some analysts question the extent to which oil is actually a viable strategic target for 
future Al-Qaeda operation, arguing instead that AQ’s "operational preference is to create 
mass casualties rather than target specific economic targets."48  AQ attacks on energy 
infrastructure, however, would be consistent with a previous conflict, however.  During 
the Iran-Iraq War, attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure included the bombing of "a 
petrochemicals facility in Jubail, sabotage on the naphtha unit at the Ras Tanura refinery, 
                                                 
45 "Saudi Aramco Refining & Distribution," Saudi Aramco, http://www.saudiaramco.com (accessed 
October 12, 2007). 
46 "All Saudi Ports Comply with ISPS Code." 
47 Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymmetric Threats and 
Islamic Extremists (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 26, 2005), 10. 
48 "Saudi oil comes under threat," Petroleum Economist, July 1, 2004, 1, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed January 10, 2008). 
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and various oil pipeline bombs."49  In Saudi Arabia, the presence of potentially 
vulnerable oil targets along the coast may be even more significant due to potential AQ 
interest in maritime attacks.  AQ has conducted multiple seaborne suicide attacks against 
various targets, including USS COLE (DDG-67) in 2000, the French tanker LIMBURG 
in 2002, and offshore Iraqi oil terminals in 2004.  Vice Admiral Patrick Walsh, then 
commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, stated in July 2006 that he was 
"wary" of possible seaborne attacks.50 
 While there is no evidence that AQ has conducted actual maritime attacks (or 
attacks on coastal installations) in Saudi Arabia, its Saudi branch has attacked Saudi oil 
infrastructure on land, and the Saudi security services claim that they have prevented AQ 
attacks.  In May 2003, Saudi authorities stated that AQ cells were planning attacks on 
"the Ras Tanurah oil facility."51  "Killing sprees" in Yanbu and Khobar during May 2004 
sent "shock waves through the global energy industry" despite the attackers not "even 
firing a shot in anger at any physical oil infrastructure."52  In May 2007, Saudi television 
aired confessions of a captured AQ member who claimed that the February 2006 suicide 
attack on the Abqaiq oil refinery near Ras Tanurah was ordered by Usama bin Laden as 
part of the Saudi AQ cell’s plan to attack "the main oil facilities and areas, such as Ras 
Tanura and Jubail."53  In November 2007 the Saudi government claimed that they had 
detained "more than 200 suspected militants, including a cell that had been planning an 
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imminent attack on a support installation in an oil-rich eastern province and others who 
were attempting to smuggle missiles into the country."54  
 Much analysis has been devoted to the possible impacts of a terrorist attack on 
Saudi oil infrastructure.  Former CIA officer Bob Baer hypothesized a devastating worst-
case scenario in his 2003 book Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold our Soul 
for Saudi Crude.  Baer, citing the work of "Reagan-era disaster planners," claimed that "if 
terrorists were to simultaneously hit only five of the many sensitive points in Saudi 
Arabia’s downstream oil system, they could put the Saudis out of the oil-producing 
business for about two years."55  Among those "sensitive points" include maritime targets 
at Ju’aymah and Ras Tanurah, particularly offshore "surface metering equipment and 
control platforms," "underwater pipelines," "mooring buoys", and "onshore tank farms."  
According to Baer, "the waters surrounding the arid Arabian peninsula remain, vessel for 
vessel, one of the most dangerous navigable sites on earth."  A seaborne attack against 
this infrastructure "would be devastating."  In addition, more complex attack scenarios, 
such as a September 11-style hijacked airliner crashing into the Ras Tanurah complex, 
would "bring the world’s oil-addicted economies to their knees."56 
 Baer is not alone in viewing the Saudi oil industry as a vulnerable target, which if 
struck by terrorists, would cause dire global economic impacts.  One assessment claims 
that a successful airborne attack against major Eastern Province infrastructure such as 
Abqaiq or Ras Tanura "could take up to 50% of Saudi oil off the market for at least six 
months and with it most of the world’s spare capacity, sending oil prices through the 
ceiling,"57 thereby "throwing a wrench into the global economy."58  Another assessment 
claims that a successful attack on the Ras Tanura export terminal "could knock out half of 
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Saudi Arabia's supplies for weeks."  Other "vulnerable" infrastructure is "the 10-km 
trestle system that transports liquefied petroleum gas to the offshore Juaymah terminal."59 
 These analysts fear an attack on Saudi oil infrastructure due to Saudi Arabia’s 
dominant role in global oil production, as well as the critical importance of oil to the 
world economy itself.  Saudi Arabia possesses the world's largest known oil reserves, is 
the world’s largest oil exporter, and has "consistently acted as "swing producer" inside 
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec) to try to iron out 
supply/demand blips."60  In 2005, "Oil Shockwave," a simulation sponsored by the 
National Commission on Energy Policy, examined the possible consequences arising 
from a hypothetical scenario in which oil prices, already high due to instability in 
Nigeria, are driven even higher by a coordinated series of Al-Qaeda attacks against 
coastal oil infrastructure in both Saudi Arabia and Alaska.  The models employed in the 
scenario predicted the resulting impacts would drive world oil prices from $58 per barrel 
(the late 2005 market price) to $161 (oil prices in early 2008 have since regularly reached 
$100 per barrel).61  According to Oil Shockwave, this would "choke economic growth," 
with the global economy experiencing recession, a decline in GDP, "loss of over 2 
million jobs in 2007 relative to baseline forecasts, an historically significant decline in the 
S&P 500, and a dramatic increase in the current accounts deficit."62 
 Not everyone views Saudi oil infrastructure as a particularly vulnerable target, or 
a target whose impacts will automatically ripple through the global economy, however.  
They believe that the system is geographically vast enough to prevent attack, and 
possesses enough redundancies at critical nodes to ensure that even a well-placed attack 
would be unable to disrupt the system for long.  This camp includes Aramco’s CEO, who 
in 2004 (whether speaking out of actual confidence with his firm’s security measures, or 
to soothe the fears of nervous consumers) stated "that the oil would keep flowing even in 
the event of an attack," and that "a terrorist incident, if it were to happen, it's not going to 
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be worse than an industrial accident in a volatile industry like ours."63  As noted earlier, 
the export facilities at Ju’aymah and Ras Tanurah on the Gulf, and Yanbu on the Red 
Sea, are interlinked.  While attacks on these facilities would degrade their ability to 
process petroleum products for export (and some observers, particularly Baer, 
vehemently argue that a few critical nodes, such as Pump Station One, near Abqaiq, are 
vulnerable to attack)64 the system is set up so that exports can be shifted from one 
terminal to another in case of emergency, a redundancy which would lessen the potential 
impacts of a terrorist attack.65  Analysts citing these redundancies believe that terrorists 
"would have to step up several levels in sophistication to do lasting damage to the Saudi 
industry" as "most of the high-capacity links are redundant and repairable,"66 and that "if 
one were damaged, it's most likely another one would be able to come on line very 
quickly and replace the lost production."67  The Saudi government has also implemented 
a system designed to store oil in advance in preparation for contingencies.  Under the 
"Saudi Strategic Storage Program (SSSP)," the Saudis "will invest more than $2.9 billion 
to build five storage facilities in Riyadh, Jeddah, Abha, Madinah, and Qassim to ensure 
energy supplies in emergency situations,"68 although the extent to which this program 
could address global oil supply in the aftermath of a catastrophic attack, or just simply 
meet the Kingdom’s own energy needs, is unclear. 
 Some analysts are also skeptical of apocalyptic scenarios predicting global 
economic collapse after an attack on Saudi oil.  Because oil infrastructure has already 
been identified as a desirable terrorist target, they feel that markets have imposed a 
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"security premium" which "is already factored into the price of oil."69  As of 2004, some 
analysts argued that the price of a barrel of crude oil (then only $40) already included $8-
$10 of "risk premium,"70 with specific events driving up prices and the risk premium 
including the then-recent Madrid train bombings, attacks on Iraqi oil infrastructure 
(particularly the offshore ABOT and KAAOT terminals), and the attacks in Yanbu.71  If 
at least some of the increase in oil prices has been driven by security concerns (and not 
just higher global demand), then future attacks may not be accompanied by 
commensurate price increases (or at least increases which are not as large as those 
predicted in the worst-case scenarios), as, theoretically, those future increases have 
already taken place in the form of a risk premium.  Unfortunately, until an attack occurs, 
and actual price increases can be measured against the worst-case predictions, there is no 
clear way to determine how much current prices levels have been driven by a risk 
premium. 
 Usama bin Laden’s declared intent to strike at the West through Saudi oil, 
coupled with his distaste for the Saudi monarchy, seems to make Saudi oil infrastructure, 
particularly its maritime components in the Eastern Province, a plausible target for future 
terrorist attacks.  Analysts disagree, however, whether the history of recent attacks on the 
Saudi oil industry presage a continued assault on oil infrastructure.  Some feel that AQ 
attacks against the Saudi oil industry over the last few years indicate a shift away from 
Al-Qaeda’s "operational preference" for "mass casualties" to a focus on "specific 
economic targets" such as oil infrastructure,72 and that the industry, regardless of the 
large investment in security by the Saudi state and Aramco, is still essentially a "soft  
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target," "accessible to dispersed groups of young men who receive their inspiration from 
the pronouncements of global and regional terrorist leaders who have little or no contact 
with regional facilitators."73 
Meanwhile, other analysts argue instead that oil is not a "soft target" at all, and 
"that terrorist successes have been few and far between."  In fact, they claim that the 
failure of recent attacks against the industry will drive a shift towards real soft targets 
such as people, because "the security forces seem much more able to cope than in earlier 
attacks" against critical infrastructure. 74  Some Saudis have argued that the fact because 
many of the attacks in 2004 were prosecuted against housing, company offices, and other 
places far from the actual oil processing facilities themselves, AQ has shifted its 
operational preference towards that sort of soft target and not infrastructure.75  The 2006 
failed attack can variously be explained as an aberration from this new emphasis on soft 
targets, or indicate a continued AQ desire to attack significant oil infrastructure. 
D. SECURITY MEASURES: IDENTITY AND CREDENTIAL 
VERIFICATION 
 While physical security is clearly an important factor in preventing illicit activity, 
that security can be circumvented if not accompanied with an equally effective manner of 
issuing credentials and verifying the identities or intentions of individuals, ships, or cargo 
entering the port.  The strongest lock is useless if thieves know the combination or have 
the key.  Saudi maritime authorities claim that all "vessels bound for any Saudi port must 
produce on arrival their valid International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC), issued by the 
vessel's flag state in accordance with the ISPS Code," and "must furnish a pre-arrival 
statement in line with the Gulf Co-operation Council rules providing extensive detail."76  
Anecdotal descriptions paint an impressive picture of the security measures taken to 
ensure that only authorized personnel have access to Saudi maritime and oil 
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infrastructure.  A BBC reporter stated that "he had to pass through six checkpoints staffed 
by armed guards to reach the Ras Tanura refinery,"77 while another journalist claimed 
that at Ras Tanura, "employees must pass through a gate with 12 armed guards, then 
approach a second one where 18 guards and a bomb-sniffing dog stand at the ready," and 
also "surrender their passports for coded ID cards that they swipe through an electronic 
reader, then enter PIN numbers."78  The extent to which these measures are actually 
effective at preventing infiltration by terrorists, criminals, or other illicit actors is unclear, 
however.  While not actually taking place in a port, the 2004 AQ rampage in Khobar 
demonstrated "major flaws in the security operations," as the attackers were reportedly 
able "to slip through numerous security checkpoints and shoot their way into a number of 
buildings."79 
 Even a system with identification cards and checkpoints can be vulnerable to 
infiltration from within.  "Thousands of foreigners from Asia and the west work in the 
Saudi oil industry,"80 and insufficient checks of these individuals’ backgrounds may 
present security risks.  In addition, there are many concerns that Saudi employees may 
present the biggest security risk.  At least some of the attackers who killed seven at a 
petrochemical company’s office in Yanbu during May 2004 "apparently worked at the 
company and used their entry passes to gain access to their victims."81  Even though 
many observers assess Aramco’s security as "superb," vulnerabilities to an "inside job" 
remain as "the weakest point of the system."82  While Aramco and the Saudi government 
claim that "no employees have been linked to terror plots," some sources have claimed 
that several Aramco employees (working in Information Technology support) have been 
"interrogated" by Saudi security officials.  While the government deemed that these 
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individuals "weren't Al Qaeda," and "there was no determination of an actual plot," the 
Aramco employees were described as "Al Qaeda sympathizers."83 
Another possibility is "that Jihadi militants have penetrated Saudi security 
forces."84  While some AQ sympathizers or operatives may have infiltrated the Saudi 
security forces, the number of individuals who may have done so, and their ability to gain 
access to important or sensitive billets, is still unclear.  Some analysts assess that while at 
least some degree of AQ "recruitment was inevitable," the negative impacts of such 
infiltration has been minimal, as "it occurred at so limited a level that most of the few cell 
members with any ties to the military or security services only had limited prior service 
and training and have only held minor positions."85  
E. SECURITY MEASURES: PHYSICAL SECURITY 
 The Saudi government and Aramco have made significant investments towards 
improving physical security in their ports, especially in port facilities through which 
petroleum products are exported.  The Saudi government views its oil infrastructure as a 
strategic national asset, meriting state (including the military) protection.  Estimates of 
the (classified) Saudi security budget were $5.5 billion in 2003, and over $7 billion in 
2004, with $750 devoted to security at oil facilities in 2003 and 2004.86  Meanwhile, 
Aramco officials claimed that the firm had spent $250 million in improving its security in 
2006 and 2007, "completely revamping its internal security" in order to improve its "very 
good commercial security measures" to better "deal with a concerted terrorist attack."87 
 Saudi authorities claim that the "sheer vastness" of the Kingdom’s oil facilities, 
"spread out over thousands of square miles," are an effective first-line-of-defense against 
terrorist attack.88  Saudi and Aramco officials have devoted much of their spending on 
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security towards purchasing a variety of sensors and other technologically advanced 
equipment, including "cameras, motion sensors and helicopter patrols."89  The Ras 
Tanura facilities are protected by electric "double fencing,"90 motion detectors, video 
cameras, and an "antiaircraft missile battery."91  The Saudis also claim that "many of the 
more elaborate security precautions are hidden from view and that Saudi oil facilities 
have the same level of protection as military bases."92  Aramco infrastructure in the 
Eastern Province is linked through a centralized command-and-control network, with the 
"Abqaiq Area Emergency Control Center (ECC)" responsible for "radio and telephone 
communication systems" linking "the Shaybah field, export stations, and pipeline control 
hubs."93 
 Investment in personnel is matched by investment in equipment.  Saudi officials 
claim that their security officers have effectively dealt with these types of threats before, 
citing the May 2004 attack in Yanbu, in which they "quickly cordoned off the industrial 
portions of Yanbu and forced the attackers away from the compound."94  Other analysts, 
however, argue that enhanced security has "done little to reduce a growing number of 
attacks on key installations."95 
 Estimates of the size of Aramco’s armed security forces range from 5,000 to 
7,500 individuals.96  The Saudi military and internal security forces also devote 
significant manpower to these efforts.  As many as 30,000 men currently secure the 
Kingdom’s oil infrastructure, conducting numerous activities and manning a variety of 
equipment.  Their activities include regular patrols of military aircraft (including Saudi 
Air Force F-15s), operating "anti-aircraft installations," and Saudi Navy and Coast Guard 
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vessels escorting tankers in and out of port.97  Analysts assess that the "Saudi navy, coast 
guard, and National Guard are able to provide adequate security screening for key ports, 
desalination facilities, and petroleum export facilities with roughly two weeks of 
warning," and that while the Saudi government concedes that some security officials 
"have been implicated in smuggling by sea" in the past, "this activity is severely punished 
and does not seem to be more common than in other countries."98  Meanwhile, some oil 
industry figures have criticized Saudi maritime security measures, claiming that the Saudi 
Navy did not possess enough ships, and lacked "sufficient trained personnel-especially 
divers-to carry out counter-terrorism measures on their own."99   
 The Ministry of Interior has also established a special unit devoted to protecting 
critical infrastructure, featuring representatives from "the Special Security Forces, Special 
Emergency Forces, the General Security Service (the domestic intelligence service), 
regular forces of the Public Security Administration (including police officers) and 
specialised brigades of the National Guard," as well as "the Petroleum Installation 
Security Force (PISF)."100  Apparently, Saudi leaders felt that this unit was not capable 
enough to combat the perceived threat from terrorism, however, and was "hamstrung by 
its reliance on cooperation from the police, the military or the Saudi national guard."  In 
late 2007 the Saudi government announced that a 35,000 man "rapid reaction force" will 
replace the Ministry of Interior’s special unit.  The new force "will operate independently 
of other Saudi state security forces, allowing it to react more quickly to any threat."101 
F. ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES 
 The Saudi government and Aramco have devoted a great deal of resources 
towards securing maritime infrastructure, particularly as so much of that maritime 
infrastructure is also a vital component of its strategic oil industry.  It is difficult to argue 
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that the implementation of ISPS is the root cause of this Saudi concern with security, 
however.  The purported vulnerability of Saudi oil to terror attacks has been well 
addressed in mainstream journalism, particularly after the attacks of 2003 and 2004, and 
the publication of Baer’s book in 2003.  This terror scenario has even entered popular 
culture, with two television movies, the BBC’s The Man Who Broke Britain (2004), and 
FX’s Oil Storm (2005), dramatizing the possible global economic chaos following a 
significant terrorist attack at Ras Tanura.  One can argue that the Saudis have to at least 
look like they are doing something to keep their oil industry safe.  Regardless of whether 
Saudi oil infrastructure is an irresistible target for terrorists, it is impossible to empirically 
determine whether Saudi investment in security has been well spent in the absence of a 
successful attack.  It is clear, however, that there has been no maritime or seaborne attack 
against Saudi ports or oil infrastructure by AQ or any other terrorist group since 2001 (or 
at least that Saudi authorities have not publicly acknowledged any such attacks).  The 
most serious attacks have either been land attacks against land targets, land attacks 
against coastal targets, or attacks against personnel in coastal cities.   
 Security measures can also be considered in terms beyond their ability to prevent 
attacks, and instead by their impact on trade.  High costs for new security measures (new 
equipment, training, and personnel) may be passed on to consumers, or place a strain on 
governments and firms involved in maritime trade.  There are numerous factors 
impacting the amount of cargo processed through a port, though, and it is difficult to 
isolate those resulting solely from increases in ISPS-driven security costs.  Data 
published by the Saudi Ports Authority and Aramco indicate that trade through Saudi 
ports has not declined since ISPS was implemented in 2004.   
 Between 2004 and 2006, total throughput in all SPA-managed ports increased 
11.6% (from 120 million DWT to 134 million DWT).  Throughput at the Persian Gulf 
ports increased 28.6% at King Abzulaziz Dammam, 7.0% at King Fahd Jubail, and 
38.9% at Jubail Commercial during the same time frame.  The only significant decline in 
any category was a 36% decline in the number of passengers traveling through Saudi 
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ports between 2004 and 2006, dropping from 2.1 million to 1.3 million.102  Liquid Bulk 
Cargo processed through King Abdulaziz Dammam did drop 5% (although that port 
accounts for less than 1% of total Saudi bulk cargo throughput).  Liquid bulk cargo 
throughput also dropped 4.8% at King Fahd between 2004 and 2005, but rebounded in 
2006, growing 10.7% over the two-year period between 2004 and 2006.103 
 Saudi Aramco does not provide statistics differentiating exports through 
individual ports, but does publish export data for its Saudi ports as a whole.  Calls by 
tankers at Aramco ports declined between 2004 and 2006 in all classes (2,145 to 1,913 
for crude oil tankers, 1,809 to 1,417 for refined product tankers, and 534 to 470 for LPG 
tankers).  That decline is not reflected in terms of volume, however.  Actual barrels of 
crude and LPG increased 2.5% and 4.2%, respectively (from 2.4 trillion to 2.5 trillion 
crude, and 266 million to 285 million LPG), with only refined products experiencing a 
4% decline.104  Apparently fewer, larger, tankers have been carrying exports from Saudi 
Arabia.  
 Correlating this data with ISPS-driven security measures is difficult.  Changes in 
Saudi port throughput during this period may have been driven by a strong global 
demand for oil (and high oil prices), thus overwhelming any possible negative impacts 
resulting from outlays on security.  Saudi Arabia’s role as the globe’s "swing producer" 
may also prove significant, as the Kingdom’s exports do not necessarily reflect only 
responses to changes in global demand, but also attempts to decrease or increase 
production in order to keep world prices at what they deem the most desirable level.  As 
of January 2008, despite record high oil prices, Saudi daily production of 9 million 
barrels per day was approximately 2 million barrels less than full capacity.105  Another 
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possible explanation is that the Saudi monarchy, very much intertwined with the oil 
industry (and almost every other significant part of the economy), may be absorbing the 
security costs without passing them on to consumers or anyone else in an obvious way.  
The authoritarian nature of the Saudi monarchy ensures that they are able to keep state 
finances opaque.  What is clear is that the costs of ISPS or other security measures were 
not strong enough on their own to drive down aggregate throughput in Saudi ports. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The importance of the Saudi oil industry and the presence of an active Al-Qaeda 
cell in Saudi Arabia present a unique maritime security challenge.  Implementing the 
ISPS code security measures has not been a challenge for the Saudi state, but ensuring 
that maritime (and other) security measures address the vulnerabilities of Saudi maritime 
infrastructure may be more difficult to accomplish.  Pouring money into expensive 
equipment and manpower-intensive special security forces may not address weaknesses 
from within, and assessments are mixed regarding the actual ability of Saudi security 
forces to prevent or deal with a major attack on important infrastructure.  While these 
measures can be deemed a success in the absence of an attack, and efficient in the sense 
that Saudi port throughput has not decreased, other factors, particularly stratospherically 




III. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The United Arab Emirates is the regional maritime hub for the Middle East.  
Ships ranging in size from the largest tankers and container cargo vessels to rickety 
wooden dhows carry goods to and from this busy crossroads.  UAE governments (both 
that of the central state and the various Emirates, particularly Dubai) have invested 
heavily in commercial infrastructure.  State-owned firms such as DP World have 
successfully implemented a program to make UAE and UAE-based firms among the 
world leaders in trade and tourism.  An important element of that investment has been the 
funding of a significant port security program, involving physical security measures, 
technology, and training security personnel.  DP World, the state-owned port 
management firm that is now a global colossus managing major facilities on every 
continent, has received numerous awards and recognition as having security and 
management practices on par with or better than any practiced across the globe.  What 
remains unresolved is whether the industry best practices at Jebel Ali, DP World’s 
flagship port, are matched by practices at the smaller, nearby dhow ports in both Dubai 
and neighboring Emirates.    
 UAE is a regional business center and a relatively unregulated laissez-faire 
environment.  Dubai’s success be attributed in large part to its business-friendly 
atmosphere; however, that atmosphere also may provide an opportunity for corruption 
and exploitation by illicit actors.  UAE authorities do seem to be simultaneously 
establishing an economy dominated by free-trade zone, and friendliness to multi-national 
firms, but from within the context of a surveillance state intent on deterring a variety of 
internal security threats.  On one hand, UAE has been the site of significant Al-Qaeda 
(AQ) fundraising, and the location in which alleged AQ operative Abdul-Rahim al-
Nashiri was arrested while allegedly planning maritime attacks, indicating that UAE may 
face significant threats from maritime terrorism.  At the same time, UAE has 
implemented significant security measures, and has cooperated closely with Western 
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security and intelligence services.  UAE authorities turned Nashiri over to the U.S. upon 
his capture, possibly indicating a conscientious effort to combat terrorism.  Maintaining 
UAE as a business and tourist haven may require compromises between driven by the 
often competing desires for freedom and security.   
 Data available on UAE port activity since the 2004 implementation of the ISPS 
standards indicate that the costs of implementing those standards has not been large 
enough (or passed on to shippers) to negatively impact trade.  Throughput in Dubai-area 
ports has increased in almost every category since 2004.  Possible explanations include 
the booming local economy, or the ego of local leaders, intent on making the Dubai 
metroplex a glamorous, prosperous world-class business center, regardless of the cost to 
the state.  Booming trade through smaller ports may in large part be driven by demand for 
consumer goods in Iraq, Iran, and the Horn of Africa.  Just as in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
the actual economic impact of ISPS and other port security standards is difficult to 
determine, although it is clear that any costs that may have been incurred have not been 
significant enough to overwhelm those other economic and political factors. 
B. PORT OVERVIEW 
 UAE, particularly the Emirate of Dubai, is a major regional maritime hub, acting 
as a commercial gateway for much of the Indian Ocean basin, connecting the Far East, 
South Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East.  In 2006, UAE ports handled almost 11 
million TEUs (Twenty-foot Equivalent Units, the standard measure used to quantify 
containerized cargo), the seventh-most containers of any state in the world.106  The 
primary ports in Dubai, Jebel Ali and Port Rashid, are operated by DP World, a 
subsidiary of the state-owned firm Dubai World.  The Dubai ports complex is huge, 
handling almost 9 million TEUs in 2006, the eighth most of any single port in the 
world.107  The Dubai ports are the "flagship facilities" in DP World’s global empire (42 
terminals in 22 countries), with Jebel Ali the "largest container port between Rotterdam 
and Singapore."  DP World claims it is the "world’s largest man-made harbor."  Dubai’s 
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rulers view the Jebel Ali port and adjacent free-trade zone, coupled with a nearby 
international airport and "Dubai Logistics City" as important elements in maintaining the 
Emirate’s prominent position in global trade.  Another element in UAE and Dubai 
"solidifying" their "role as a shipping center is the development of Dubai Maritime City, 
the world’s most comprehensive maritime complex," a future home to "ship repair and 
maintenance companies," office space, and "retail outlets and commercial showrooms for 
yachts, ships and boats, as well as for high-end design services."108   
 Realizing the high-stakes in maintaining their prominent position, Jebel Ali’s 
operators have placed a heavy emphasis on security.  The fact that Jebel Ali is "the most 
heavily visited overseas US navy shore leave location in the world, receiving 200 warship 
visits a year and providing unequalled berthing facilities for US naval vessels in the 
Gulf,"109 seems to indicate that extremely force-protection-conscious organizations such 
as the U.S. Navy recognize and appreciate that investment in security, and deem Jebel Ali 
as the most safe and accommodating facility in the Gulf, an important operational and 
logistical asset in a region characterized by a high tempo of US Naval operations.  
 Modern facilities such as Jebel Ali and Port Rashid, well integrated into the global 
economy and servicing the major shipping lines, are not the only port facilities in Dubai, 
however.  Dubai Creek, the site of the original settlement in Dubai and "the traditional 
center of Dhow traffic between the Gulf ports and Iran, Pakistan, India and all of East 
Africa, continues to provide a strong economic boost to the economy," as well as serving 
as a tourist attraction.110  Nearby Hamriyah port also serves vessels shipping cargo 
between Dubai and South Asia, the Horn of Africa, Iran, Iraq, and other ports on the 
Arabian Peninsula.111  The "small and medium ships" that call at Hamriyah take 
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advantage of "the port's role as a major re-exporting hub."112  Dubai (and ports in the 
neighboring Emirates of Sharjah and Ajman) serves as a link between the modern, global 
economy, and smaller, regional and sub-regional economies served by traditional vessels 
such as dhows.  Twenty-first century and millennia-old commerce occur side-by-side in 
Dubai (although the exact extent to which the commerce of the new Dubai favored by the 
international jet-set will push aside the old ways remains unclear). 
 Dubai’s neighbor, Sharjah, also contains ports active in regional trade.  In fact, 
Port Khalid in Sharjah was "the first container berth in the Gulf."  The Emirate of Sharjah 
also encompasses the large Khor Fakkan terminal on the Arabian Sea, which is capable 
of handling 3 million TEUs of container cargo.113  The Sharjah ports are operated by the 
firm Gulftainer.   
 Ajman, another Emirate adjacent to Dubai, has a much smaller port, but one still 
capable of handling a wide variety of cargo, including containers, break-bulk cargo, bulk 
cargo, and vehicles on RO-RO vessels (Roll on-Roll off).  Re-exports from Ajman are 
shipped throughout the region.114  That trade includes shipping to a variety of ports.  
Emirates Port Services, which manages the Ajman port, advertises that vessels from 
Ajman offer "direct services" to Iraq (including Umm Qasr, Khor az Zubayr, and Abu 
Flus), Somalia, and Iran (Bandar Abbas).  Those services, plus Ajman’s "proximity to the 
inter-emirate highway and to the main industrial and Trading centers of UAE," 115 make 
it a link between the developed western economies whose trade moves through the big 
Dubai ports such as Jebel Ali, and the small dhows serving the developing world, 
including regional trouble spots. 
 DP World also manages the port of Fujairah, outside of the Straits of Hormuz on 
the Arabian Sea/Gulf of Oman.  Fujairah is particularly important as it has become "one 
of the three most important bunkering centres around the world after Singapore and 
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Rotterdam" (reminiscent of Jebel Ali’s status as the busiest container port geographically 
between Singapore and Rotterdam).  In addition, its convenient location outside of, yet 
close to, the Persian Gulf has propelled Fujairah into the ranks of larger container ports as 
well, expanding its cargo handling capabilities to 1.7 million TEUs.116 
 The re-export of used cars by Dubai and Sharjah is one example of these regional 
commercial linkages and relationships.  In 2005 the Japan Auto Appraisal Institute 
estimated that 200,000 used vehicles were exported from Japan to Dubai.  Another group, 
Business Monitor International, calculated that in 2006, 70,800 vehicles were then re-
exported from Dubai and sold to consumers throughout the region (indicating that if the 
number of Japanese exports is correct, then the numbers on re-exports are understated (or 
inaccurate), or that over half of the cars shipped to Dubai are purchased for use in UAE).  
Dubai’s "physical and legal infrastructure" which enables this trade is its large, modern 
port facilities, and the "free-trade Dubai Cars and Automotive Zone" which was 
established in 2000.117  Approximately 350 vendors at the "Ducamz" serve customers 
from around the region, selling up to 700 used vehicles, mostly Toyotas, per day.118  A 
similar market in nearby Sharjah features at least 500 dealers selling used cars.119  
 Among the primary destinations of re-exported cars are Qatar, Iran, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Libya.120  Demand is particularly high in war-torn states such as Iraq 
and Afghanistan, which had been largely isolated from the global consumer economy 
under the respective rule of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban.  One pair of Iraqi car 
dealers interviewed in 2004 indicated that during their "frequent" visits to Dubai, they 
would "buy as many as 25 cars at a time," paying mechanics later to switch the steering 
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wheels of the Japanese vehicles from the right to the left side.121  Cars are then shipped 
via RO-RO vessels (or any other ship that vehicles can be loaded on) from ports in 
Dubai, Ajman, or Sharjah, to southern Iraqi ports such as Umm Qasr, Abu Flus, and Khor 
az Zubayr.  As for Afghanistan, vehicles are shipped in containers to Iranian ports such as 
Bandar Abbas and then transported to Herat in Afghanistan.  Local customs officials in 
2005 estimated that "that about 80-100 vehicles" crossed the border via this route 
daily.122  While no one has been able to identify insurgents who had purchased vehicles 
from the large used-car markets in Dubai or Sharjah, then shipped them to Iraq or 
Afghanistan for the specific purpose of using them as Vehicle-Borne Improvised 
Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), the flood of vehicles into these countries (driven primarily 
by pent-up demand after decades of privation) has provided valuable opportunities for 
insurgents to procure the means for a relatively cheap and deadly weapon.  The trade in 
vehicles offers a clear example of UAE’s status as a commercial link between developed 
and developing economies.  The key, unresolved, question for states such as the U.S. is 
whether UAE’s commercial linkages between the developing and developed world make 
it a gateway through which illicit actors can attack the West. 
 Most UAE ports announced their compliance with the ISPS regulations before the 
July 1, 2004 deadline.  Some analysts have identified that initiative to promptly 
implement ISPS, as well as Dubai’s membership in the U.S.’s Container Security 
Initiative (CSI, Dubai is the only Middle East port participating in the program), as an 
attempt to earn a valuable "seal of approval," which would cement the various Dubai-area 
ports' status as the premier regional maritime center, with standards and practices are on 
par with or better than the most advanced facilities in the world.  Those same analysts 
feel that Dubai’s membership in CSI will initiate a "ripple effect" of better safety and 
security standards throughout the Gulf because they "give participating ports a security 
                                                 
121 Zaun and Singer. 
122 Anna Paterson, Understanding Markets in Afghanistan: A Study of the Market in Second-hand 
Cars (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2005), 19.  
 37
rating that merchants and shippers welcome," meaning that neighboring ports will be 
forced to keep up with the higher standards in order to remain competitive.123   
 The DP World-managed ports of Port Rashid and Jebel Ali in Dubai were "the 
first two ports in the UAE to receive the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
(ISPS) Code certificate."124  Fujairah "was awarded compliance with the ISPS Code 
shortly after Port Rashid and Jebel Ali port in July."125  Sharjah’s ports were also 
compliant with the ISPS regulations ahead of schedule.126  A review of the IMO’s Global 
Integrated Shipping Information System database indicates that among the major Dubai-
area ports servicing primarily larger commercial vessels, only Ajman missed the 
deadline; its approved Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) was filed and approved as of 
December 18, 2004.  
 DP World's recent global expansion may have played a role in the firm's efforts to 
implement industry-leading security practices.  DP World-managed ports include high-
profile facilities in Asia, North and South America, Australia, and Europe.  Its 2006 
purchase of the British firm P&O entailed DP World assuming operations of six P&O-
managed ports in the U.S.  A major political firestorm derailed that portion of the P&O 
purchase (nominally caused by the concerns of U.S. politicians that UAE nationals had 
taken part in past AQ attacks, including the September 11, 2001 hijackings, and that UAE 
and UAE-based financial institutions have provided and enabled AQ financing), despite 
support from President Bush and approval by all concerned U.S. government agencies.  
Although that element of the firm’s expansion ultimately failed, DP World aggressively 
attempted to portray the firm as an industry leader in the areas of port management and 
security, and compliance with the most stringent standards played an integral part of a 
public relations strategy that continues even in the aftermath of the deal's collapse.  
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C. TERRORISM AND UAE 
 Despite Dubai’s current reputation as one of the globe’s most dynamic 
commercial centers, the same laissez-faire attitude which has made it the Middle East’s 
premier destination for globe-trotting businessmen and tourists may have also increased 
its vulnerability to exploitation by a variety of illicit actors.  Its status as the regional 
maritime hub ensures that at least some of these vulnerabilities involve potential illicit 
seaborne activities.  Some analysts have described the "bustling roguish entrepot of the 
UAE" "as an easy operating environment for terrorists, characterised by porous borders 
and soft targets."  In addition, just like their counterparts engaged in legitimate 
commerce, "non-native terrorists" are also able to take advantage of UAE’s role as the 
region’s transportation nexus.127   
  Large, "intertwined criminal and financial services elements" in Dubai were used 
by AQ planners to help finance the September 11 attacks.  Muslim terrorists have made 
UAE home, including members of the Pakistani AQ-affiliated group Harkat ul-Jihad-e- 
Islami.  Fighters fleeing Afghanistan after the 2001 U.S. invasion also allegedly used 
dhows to smuggle themselves into the country.  While UAE authorities claim to have 
successfully implemented strict maritime security and immigration measures to inhibit 
illicit maritime entry into the country, skeptics predict that smugglers will simply shift the 
landfall of their dhows to Oman in response to this pressure, now choosing to enter UAE 
through the land border between UAE and Oman.128 
 To date, the most significant connection between Al-Qaeda, maritime terrorism, 
and UAE, was the 2002 capture by Dubai authorities of Abdul-Rahim al-Nashiri.  Nashiri 
allegedly "conceived and oversaw the attacks on U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and 
Mombasa in August 1998, the October 2000 USS Cole bombing in Yemen, and finally 
the attack on the French-flagged oil tanker Limburg in October 2002."  When captured, 
he was reportedly "taking advantage of the transnational trafficking networks based in" 
UAE, "attempting to procure small speedboats and scouting possible freighters to hijack 




and use as a mother ship or indeed as a floating bomb in future maritime attacks."129  The 
notion that a known AQ leader who executed a series of successful maritime attacks 
(successful in the sense that both COLE and LIMBURG were engaged by AQ, although 
ultimately neither ship was actually destroyed) was planning future attacks near the site 
of a busy international port frequented by the US Navy, likely chilled both UAE and U.S. 
leaders.   
 Nashiri has lately become the subject of a different sort of international attention.  
Currently detained at Guantanamo Bay, Nashiri, along with another alleged senior AQ 
leader, Abu Zubaida, was water-boarded during interrogations by U.S. intelligence 
personnel after his capture.130  Journalists have argued that U.S. descriptions of Abu 
Zubaida as a senior AQ operational planner are false, and that instead he was just "a 
mentally ill minor functionary" who admitted to involvement in multiple al-Qaeda plots 
only after being tortured.131  Nashiri has himself claimed that he admitted to involvement 
in the COLE, embassies, and LIMBURG attacks only after being tortured, although he 
did admit in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal to have accepted money from Usama 
bin Laden in order to purchase a boat in Dubai for use in what bin Laden described as 
"military actions."  Despite the instructions from bin Laden, Nashiri claimed that instead 
of proceeding with that attack, he "dissolved the project," sold the boat and intended to 
live peacefully in Dubai.132  Nashiri’s story that he could take AQ’s money and not go 
through with an attack seems implausible, but while it is likely that Nashiri had ties to 
AQ and was involved in or aware of multiple terrorist attacks, the actual extent of 
operational planning regarding a seaborne attack in Dubai remains unresolved. 
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D. SECURITY MEASURES: PHYSICAL SECURITY 
 DP World has declared that enhanced port security is an important corporate goal.  
In 2007 the firm announced that it planned to spend approximately "$300 million to 
secure 42 terminals that we operate worldwide."133  Although that investment will be 
spread throughout its global operations, Dubai ports such as Jebel Ali are centerpieces for 
DP World’s program to demonstrate that "Hundred per cent security is no longer a myth, 
but a reality,"134 and observers have described security at Jebel Ali as "a model for the 
post-9/11 world."135  Dubai physical security measures include "CCTV, alarm systems as 
well as anti-invasion systems across all its ports and terminal facilities."136  Coupled with 
the "elaborate web of technologically advanced barriers and detection systems" that the 
Dubai government is installing throughout the Emirate, Dubai maritime infrastructure is 
among the safest in the world.  Observers argue that for DP World, lavish investment on 
security is seen as a sound business move, "in the belief such measures will boost the 
perceived security of their ports, making them more attractive transshipment points."137  
Regardless of whether the high tech security measures implemented in Dubai actually 
result in better physical security, Dubai’s leaders see them as a critical element of their 
plan to maintain the Emirate’s status as a regional and global business center. 
 While the major ports in Dubai seem to have taken the lead in implementing 
strong physical security measures, the extent to which effective physical security has 
been put in place at other regional ports is unclear.  While authorities in Sharjah 
announced that along with ISPS implementation that they had imposed "stricter port  
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entry controls,"138 it is as yet unclear whether these concepts have filtered down to the 
smaller dhow ports engaged in trade with less secure parts of the world (Iraq, Iran, and 
the Horn of Africa). 
E. SECURITY MEASURES: ILLICIT USE OF PORTS BY CRIMINALS 
AND TERRORISTS 
 A prominent example of illicit use of UAE ports occurred before the coalition 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.  According to the UN investigation chaired by former Federal 
Reserve chairman Paul Volcker into corruption under the Oil-for-Food program,139 at 
least two UAE-based shipping companies paid bribes to a Saddam-owned front company 
in Dubai for the rights to ship Australian wheat to Iraq.140  A vigorous trade in consumer 
goods currently takes place between ports in UAE and Iraq.  Another commodity traded 
between the two states is oil, including both crude oil exports from Iraq, as well as fuel 
oil (diesel, gasoline, kerosene, etc.) imports to Iraq from other states in the region (Iraq 
currently has very little capability to refine crude oil).  Possible illicit elements of that 
trade will be discussed at length in the next chapter covering Iraq, however, it is 
important to note here that UAE-based shippers and energy interests may be profiting by 
trading in either oil (both crude and fuel oil) stolen from Iraq, or fuel resold on Iraq’s 
"gray market" (Iraq subsidizes fuel, meaning that Iraqis can often make more money 
selling fuel to those who can ship it elsewhere to places such as UAE where it is then sold 
at market price, rather than use it.  This sort of a transaction requires access to imported 
fuel, however, meaning that entities involved directly in facilitating imports are more able 
to engage in this type of activity). 
 The depiction of UAE as a home of international criminals, corruption, and 
smuggling is not entirely accurate, however.  UAE, particularly cosmopolitan Dubai, is 
increasingly a high-tech surveillance state, "a place where great care has to be taken to 
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avoid the attention of local and Western security services," due to vigorous efforts to 
"crack down on crime, people and narcotics-trafficking and economic migration."141  
Nashiri’s capture in UAE, and the local authorities subsequently turning him over to U.S. 
custody, indicates at least some intent to stop terrorist activity, and a degree of 
willingness to cooperate with Western intelligence agencies.  Technological measures 
include a "national identification card system, iris-scanning technology, and other 
advances in immigration documentation," with "closed-circuit television… incorporated 
into metropolitan areas."142  To prevent the suspected shift of illegal entry to the land 
border with Oman caused by tighter security in sea and airports, "the UAE is constructing 
an anti-vehicle barrier along the accessible areas of the UAE-Oman border to channel 
traffic to legal points of entry."143  In addition to the large investment in security by the 
UAE government, Dubai has devoted considerable resources to protect the Emirate’s 
current status as a premier business and tourist center.  Officials have claimed that 
Dubai’s "smart system," including "an electronic monitoring system on every building 
that will trigger the fire extinguishers and report accidents, once they happen, via 
satellites linked to a central civil defence operations room." will make Dubai "the world's 
safest city by 2010."144 
F. SECURITY MEASURES: SUPPLY CHAIN/CARGO SECURITY 
 The major UAE ports are also the regional leaders in terms of efforts to ensure 
cargo security and protect the integrity of global supply chains.  In 2004, authorities in 
Sharjah announced that in addition to being in compliance with ISPS, "all empty 
containers entering any of Sharjah's facilities have been physically inspected" along with 
additional "cargo inspections."145 
 DP World states that its flagship Dubai ports meet the most strict cargo inspection 
and security measures practiced worldwide.  By any objective measure, DP World port 
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management practices are on par with or better than all others in the world.  In 2006, 
"Lloyd’s List selected DP World as "Port Operator of the Year.""146  Also in that year, 
the firm received the "the first ISO/PAS 28000 certificate of approval for international 
supply chain security" in the world from Lloyd’s Register Quality Assurance.147  The 
International Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) ISO/PAS 28000 security initiative 
"is designed to enable better monitoring of freight flows, to combat smuggling and to 
respond to the threat of piracy and terrorist attacks as well as to create a safe and secure 
international supply chain regime."148  DP World has "commissioned a three-tier fool-
proof container security initiative that involves X-ray, radiation and Optical Container 
Recognition (OCR)," which DP World claims "can detect any radiation being emitted 
from the container, while the OCR captures container data and manages the supply 
chain."149  Dubai was also among the first ports taking part in the U.S.’s Container 
Security Initiative (CSI).  Dubai is one of the 58 ports worldwide in which American 
Customs officers "use non-intrusive inspection (NII) and radiation detection technology 
to screen high-risk containers before they are shipped to U.S. ports."150 
 This seemingly robust inspection program has its critics, however.  Skeptics 
question the ability of the scanners currently employed to identify dangerous items in a 
container.  In particular, they are incapable of detecting "a key radioactive ingredient in a 
nuclear bomb, even if it was just modestly shielded."  In addition, "only a small fraction 
of the millions of containers" are currently inspected, and the techniques employed to 
identify suspect containers for inspection makes use of "often-incomplete data."151  
Clearly CSI and other container inspection programs are well intentioned in their desire 
                                                 
146 "DP World: A Home Grown Success Story," US-Arab Tradeline 15 (June, 2007), 32. 
147 "LRQA approves DP World to ISO/PAS 28000:2005, a world first," Lloyd’s Register, September 
11, 2006, 
http://www.lr.org/News+and+Events/LRQA+approves+DP+World+to+ISOPAS+280002005+a+world+fir
st.htm (accessed January 28, 2008) 
148 "ISO offers systematic approach to security management in global supply chains," International 
Organization for Standardization, November 11, 2005, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/pressrelease.htm?refid=Ref981 (accessed January 27, 2008). 
149 Rahman, "DP World Will Invest Dh1.1b in Port Security." 
150 CSI Fact Sheet, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, October 2, 2007, 1-2. 
151 Fattah and Lipton. 
 44
to prevent radioactive materials from being hidden and shipped in containers.  However, 
CSI has serious weaknesses, particularly in the equipment’s inability to identify all 
radioactive materials in containers, the program’s overemphasis on radioactive materials 
(there are plenty of other dangerous materials and illicit items which can be smuggled in 
containers), the program’s inability to either inspect all containers or successfully identify 
the suspicious ones for inspection, and an overemphasis on containerized cargo (terrorists 
could use non-container cargo vessels to smuggle illicit materials or execute a seaborne 
attack). 
G. ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES 
 Various UAE authorities have provided some clues as to the costs of these 
security measures’ implementation.  The operations manager at Gulftainer, who operates 
the Sharjah and Khor Fakkan facilities for the Sharjah Ports Authority, claimed that the 
firm's "initial investment in ISPS compliance" was Dh30 million, (approximately $8 
million dollars), as part of a total $40 million dollar investment in security at the Sharjah 
ports.152  In 2007 DP World’s security chief announced that the company was investing 
another $300 million in security for the firm’s 42 terminals, approximately $7 million per 
terminal if those costs were spread around DP World’s facilities evenly.153  When 
announcing the initial ISPS-driven investment in security for Sharjah, Gulftainer did 
admit that the requirements of ISPS would probably cause an increase in port costs and 
fees both within UAE and around the world.154 
To date it is unclear whether ISPS has encouraged trade through UAE ports by 
improving security standards, discouraged trade by increasing security costs, or had no 
real effect at all.  The impacts of ISPS-driven security measures are difficult to separate 
from security measures implemented due to other motives (DP World’s global expansion 
and accompanying campaign to be perceived as the best port management firm in the 
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world), or the economic boom in Dubai which has spread to neighbors such as Ajman 
and Sharjah.  Available data indicates that trade has not decreased since ISPS 
implementation in 2004.  Throughput at Dubai’s container ports increased 17% between 
2005 and 2006, after increasing 18.5% between 2004 and 2005, and 24.9% between 2003 
and 2004.155  "Container and General Cargo volumes" increased an average of 23% 
yearly between 2004 and 2007.156  Dubai’s "total non-oil foreign trade" increased across 
the board in 2007, 29.6% overall, including a 48% increase in exports, 35% increase in 
imports, and a 28.7% increase in re-exports.157  Any costs associated with implementing 
port security measures clearly have not hindered trade in a thriving Dubai.  Both 
container throughput and tonnage of other cargo increased in Ajman during the same 
period as well.158  Port calls at Ajman, however, a hub for the dhow trade between 
turbulent spots such as Iraq and the Horn of Africa, actually decreased between 2006 and 
2007, with the decline blamed on "turmoil in Iraq" and "renewed violence in Somalia."  
Piracy and conflict between Somali militias, the Islamic Courts Union, and Ethiopian 
forces may have hit UAE-based shipping especially hard, as "about 90% of merchant 
vessels entering Somali waters are from the UAE."159 
H. CONCLUSION 
 Port and maritime security in UAE is not uniform, as it is characterized both by 
the industry-leading practices of multi-national conglomerates such as DP World and the 
customary business practices of the small dhow ports engaged in a regional trade that has 
existed largely without change for centuries.  Dubai and its surrounding environs are 
undergoing drastic changes, with substantial investment by the state and its subsidiary 
commercial entities in a so far successful plan to transform the Emirate into a sort of Las 
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Vegas/Singapore/London hybrid on the Persian Gulf.  Poor security practices in the 
smaller ports may provide a window for terrorists to attack maritime infrastructure and 
exploit the sea for their own gain.  That potential mismatch between security practices in 
UAE ports may undermine the Emirates’ significant investments in all aspects of state 
security, and its demonstrated willingness to cooperate with Western security agencies (at 
least in cases such as Nashiri's). 
The scanning and inspection of container cargo has been one of the primary areas 
of emphasis for port security in UAE and the world as a whole.  While the inspection of 
container cargo is a desirable goal and an effective inspection regime may prevent the 
shipment of dangerous items such as radioactive materials, serious concerns remain 
regarding the effectiveness of current scanning technology, and the ability to target 
containers for inspection.  There are many containers, and it is impossible for authorities 
to inspect them all.  Devoting an inordinate amount of resources to programs which may 
not be able to accomplish the mission of total container inspection, may allow illicit 
actors to still use containers to ship their cargo, and also exploit other forms of transport, 
neglected by authorities fixated on containers.  Corruption and lax enforcement of the 
current strict security standards may also leave ample room for illicit actors to operate.   
No port in UAE has been the site of a terrorist attack since the implementation of 
ISPS, and the ports have flourished along with the burgeoning local economy.  
Regardless of the local rulers’ attitude towards radical Muslim terrorists, it seems likely 
that terror attacks within the Emirates would probably be bad for business, and 
development in Dubai has been shaped by a desire to create a business-friendly 
environment.  The potential for attacks remain, as well as vulnerabilities as yet 
unaddressed by the physical and technological measures that have been the primary area 
of investment in security thus far.  If there are costs associated with stricter security 
standards, UAE, particularly Dubai, demonstrates an instance where the state has been 




 If maritime security vulnerabilities in Saudi Arabia revolve primarily around 
threats from indigenous Al-Qaeda cells, and in UAE from difficulties in reconciling 
modern and traditional maritime standards and practices, in Iraq they currently derive 
mainly from the infiltration of the security forces charged with protecting Iraq's maritime 
infrastructure by militias and criminal groups engaged in widespread corruption and theft.  
This concern with the illicit use of Iraqi ports compounds those associated with more 
traditional conceptions of maritime terrorism, as an actual seaborne terror attack has 
occurred in Iraq.  Although operatives of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
failed to strike home against Iraq's Al Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT) in the northern Gulf, 
killing only three U.S. servicemen, that April 2004 act represented one of the few actual 
attempts by jihadists (the only one since the 2002 attack against the French tanker 
LIMBURG) to engage in the sort of seaborne terrorism against a significant maritime 
target so often hypothesized in the worst-case scenarios of terrorism analysts.  Despite the 
potential dangers associated with such an attack, observers of Iraq's maritime sector have 
since shifted their focus to the negative impacts of militia infiltration on maritime 
security.  While the threat from another ABOT-style attack is significant enough that the 
coalition has devoted its efforts at sea primarily to protecting the oil export terminals, 
Iraq presents other examples of how implementing better port security measures may not 
ultimately keep ports safe. 
 Unlike Saudi Arabia and UAE, Iraq's ports are not in compliance with the ISPS 
code.  Like Saudi Arabia and UAE, however, significant investments have been made in 
improving Iraq's port security.  In Iraq these improvements have been financed by the 
coalition, as part of a larger reconstruction plan ideally aimed at repairing the damage 
inflicted by decades of war and sanctions.  Since reopening after the invasion, Iraq's ports 
have been very busy; a development probably caused more by pent-up consumer demand 
than any feelings of security experienced by shippers trading in Iraq.   
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 The majority of port security measures implemented in Iraq address physical 
security, leaving significant vulnerabilities in the area of verifying identities and 
credentials (widespread corruption means that anyone with the right amount of cash or 
party ties can secure some access to port facilities) or cargo and supply chain security.  
While turning major ports into armed camps and building a strong Iraqi Navy are positive 
steps towards implementing strong physical security measures, many avenues remain for 
the possible illicit use of Iraq's ports.  Militias associated with Shia political parties have 
infiltrated many of the Iraqi security services charged with protecting maritime 
infrastructure.  Corruption and crime have blossomed, with trade in stolen crude oil and 
resold refined fuel products a lucrative business.  Conflict over the spoils associated with 
control over Iraq's ports and maritime oil installations presents a serious vulnerability that 
may undermine significant coalition investment in other port security programs.   
B. PORT OVERVIEW 
Possessing only a narrow, marshy coastline on the Persian Gulf, squeezed 
between Iran and Kuwait, Iraq has few deepwater ports.  Ensuring or maximizing access 
to the sea has played a central role in disputes and conflicts with its neighbors since Iraq 
was carved out of the remains of the Ottoman Empire by the British after the First World 
War. The effect of "coastal scarcity" on Iraq’s maritime access has been compounded by 
other factors, as the Shatt al-Arab (the waterway formed by the mouths of the Tigris and 
Euphrates, which empties into the northern end of the Persian Gulf), has long been 
degraded by environmental factors (silting of the mouth of the Shatt) and armed conflict.  
Almost thirty years of war have prevented Iraq’s ports from operating freely and 
normally.     
Iraq’s primary formal port facilities are Umm Qasr and Khor al Zubayr (KAZ).   
Both Umm Qasr and KAZ are located along the Khor al Abdalla waterway, a channel 
which forms the west side of the Al Faw Peninsula.  The Shatt al Arab is along the 
eastern side of Al Faw.  Another facility, Abu Flus, located along the Shatt south of 
Basra, rose to prominence during the nineties, when state-sponsored oil smugglers used it 
during the post-Desert Storm sanctions era to load oil for shipment and sale elsewhere in 
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the Persian Gulf, primarily UAE.  All of the Iraqi ports have been busy since the 2003 
invasion, with commercial operations recommencing quickly after Saddam’s fall.   
After the invasion the coalition quickly declared Umm Qasr the "official port of 
entry into Iraq," and regular RO-RO service carrying reconstruction and humanitarian 
goods between Dubai and Umm Qasr began in June 2003.160  Service to Abu Flus has 
been more irregular than at Umm Qasr, driven largely by concerns over the navigability 
of the Shatt, but has nevertheless been heavy despite a lack of actual RO-RO berths, with 
vessels (including RO-ROs) traveling there from multiple UAE ports, including Ajman, 
Hamriyah, and Dubai.161  Despite these ports’ decrepit infrastructure and Iraq’s infant 
consumer economy, they have proved vital gateways for the entry of both reconstruction 
supplies and consumer goods.  
In addition to these inland ports, two offshore oil terminals located in the northern 
Gulf, the Al Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT) and the Khor al Amaya Oil Terminal 
(KAAOT), serve as the primary export facilities for Iraqi oil.  ABOT and KAAOT 
"deliver some 1.6 million barrels of crude oil, at least 85 percent of Iraq's output, to 
buyers from all over the world."162  It is almost impossible to overstate the importance of 
these facilities to the Iraqi economy and government, as oil exports from the Basra 
governorate accounted for "nearly 90 percent" of Iraq’s "budget of $40 million" in 
2007.163   
The U.S. has declared that rebuilding Iraq’s ports is a critical reconstruction goal, and 
that eventual ISPS certification (at least for Umm Qasr and KAZ) is part of that 
process.164  As of 2006 the U.S. had "contributed over $34 million dollars towards port 
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projects,"165 and by 2007 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had "invested $67.5 million 
to rehabilitate" ABOT.166  Port reconstruction projects, in addition to building new 
berths, dredging old ones, removing unexploded ordnance, repairing cargo-handling 
facilities, and upgrading RO-RO berths, have also directly addressed security needs, most 
prominently "a 9.7 km security fence around the perimeter with 19 observation posts" at 
Umm Qasr.  Reconstruction of the facilities at Umm Qasr has greatly increased the port’s 
operations.  By 2006, at least 80 ships were offloading monthly, with volume increasing 
"across a range of commodities including cement, sugar, and wheat."167  The port’s 
capacity also increased, as U.S. Army Corps of Engineer improvements to Umm Qasr’s 
RO-RO terminal doubled "the number of the ships that can dock and unload 
simultaneously" meaning "more goods delivered and more income for the port and its 
workers."168 
 Despite some successes at restoring Iraq’s vital maritime infrastructure, the U.S. 
and coalition reconstruction effort has entailed complications, difficulties, and failures as 
well.  As noted earlier, oil exports are critical to the functioning of Iraq’s economy and 
government, with ABOT and KAAOT critical nodes in crude oil’s flow from Iraq.  
However, for much of the occupation, the "oil metering system that is supposed to 
monitor how much crude flows into and out" of the terminals did not work.  Recently 
repaired, the failure to implement what seemed to have been be a relatively simple 
technical fix over a period of several years has been variously blamed on insecurity in 
Iraq, or the incompetence of Halliburton and Parsons, the two firms contracted to fix the 
meters.  The lack of an effective metering system meant that there was no way to 
measure how much oil was exported through the terminals and loaded onto tankers.  In 
addition to being wasteful, this situation provided opportunities for shippers to smuggle 
oil since there was no certifiable way to measure the amount of oil taken onboard.169 
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 Halliburton and Parsons are not the only firms under fire because of contracts 
they received for the reconstruction of Iraq’s maritime infrastructure.  The coalition 
awarded Maersk, the Denmark-based conglomerate and shipping giant, a contract to 
operate KAZ after the 2003 invasion, a move seen by critics as a simple quid pro quo 
from the Bush administration in order to gain Danish support for the invasion.  Before it 
transferred control of KAZ to the Iraqi Ports Authority (IPA) in March 2005, Maersk was 
faced with numerous allegations of mismanagement and mistreatment of Iraqi 
employees.170   
Journalists have leveled similar criticism at Stevedoring Services of America 
(SSA Marine), a staunch anti-union U.S. firm with "a history of tight political 
connections with the White House," who the coalition awarded "a $4.8 million no-bid 
contract to operate the port of Umm Qasr" in 2003.  Anti-globalization activists believe 
that the SSA contract was not just a reward given to an administration friend, but an 
effort to strangle at birth any embryonic labor movement in post-Saddam Iraq.171  SSA 
turned operations of Umm Qasr over to the Iraqi Ports Authority in June 2004, 
immediately before the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).172   
Regardless of the validity of these allegations, they have placed a cloud over 
coalition attempts to reconstruct Iraq.  Even if these disputes were simply the result of 
misunderstandings between the locals and reconstruction officials, they have hurt the 
coalition’s maritime reconstruction program, which requires not just the rehabilitation of 
physical infrastructure, but also the Iraqi adoption of internationally recognized maritime 
standards and practices.  While the physical status of port facilities is important, the 
manner in which port operations are conducted is also important, particularly in areas 
regarding port security.  According to one participant in the port reconstruction efforts, 
Iraqis are "unfamiliar with the inter-modal system or the business processes of the 
shipping industry," practices which "have evolved over the many years since Iraq traded 
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legitimately."  Shipping is no longer the "cash-and-carry business" it was in the Saddam 
era.173  If Iraqis suspect that reconstruction efforts are simply the local manifestations of 
American neocolonialism, then they may be less likely to embrace industry-standard port 
security practices.  
C. TERRORISM AND IRAQ 
 Iraq has been the site of one of the most famous recent maritime terror attacks.  
The April 2004 suicide small boat attack by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) operatives against 
the ABOT, although unsuccessful in the sense that it failed to hit the platform itself (two 
U.S. Navy and one U.S. Coast Guard personnel were killed when their small boat was 
struck while attempting to intercept the AQI attack), sent shockwaves through the oil and 
maritime industries.  As mentioned earlier in the chapter on Saudi Arabia, this attack 
occurred around the same time as several attacks by AQ in Saudi Arabia against oil-
related targets, all of which helped to push global oil prices higher.  One assessment at 
the time was that if the attack had succeeded, "Iraq could have been dealt a serious 
economic blow and the oil spill might have rivaled the 1989 Exxon Valdez 
environmental disaster in Alaska."  Continued protection of these "lucrative targets" by 
Iraqi and coalition forces has become an essential, high profile mission.174  The oil 
terminals are not Iraq's only maritime vulnerability, however.  Iraqi ports and the vessels 
calling at them may be susceptible to small arms attack.  One American naval officer 
involved in the reconstruction efforts assessed that such an attack "could effectively end 
traffic" to Umm Qasr, citing the drastic increase in maritime insurance for ships calling in 
Iraq after the 2004 ABOT attack.175  Of course, this reasoning assumes that shippers 
trading in Iraq have actually purchased insurance, or that when faced with a choice 
between trading in Iraq without insurance, or not trading due to the high costs of 
insurance, would choose the latter option.  Despite those considerable vulnerabilities, 
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however, there have been no attacks by AQI or other groups against Iraq’s maritime 
infrastructure since the 2004 ABOT attack, a development that can possibly be explained 
by the strong presence of Shia militias in the region's security services, or the effective 
implementation of coalition maritime security practices. 
 Another aspect of maritime terrorism that impacts Iraq is the pervasive presence 
of Shia militias and political parties in the Basra region.  While not necessarily a threat to 
coalition forces (although the Sadrist-aligned Jaysh al-Mahdi and its splinter groups have 
regularly engaged coalition forces in the past), militias aligned with Shia parties such as 
the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC, formerly known as the Supreme Council of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI), Fadhila, and the Sadrists, have infiltrated the 
security services which protect and operate Iraq’s maritime infrastructure, including ports 
and oil export facilities.  Numerous reports have alleged that these parties are either 
complicit with, or are directing, elements that are engaged in widespread illicit maritime 
activities, particularly the smuggling of crude oil and refined fuel products.  While 
smuggling and the crime associated with it may not present immediate security threats, 
the inability of Iraq’s security services either to protect Iraq’s maritime infrastructure, or 
to refrain from exploiting their access to graft and corruption, may significantly degrade 
Iraq’s economic development.  Continued militia involvement in corruption may also fuel 
the continuing (often violent) struggle by these parties for control of the resources of the 
Iraqi state, ultimately forestalling the establishment of a peaceful political system in Iraq. 
D. SECURITY MEASURES: PHYSICAL SECURITY 
 A significant portion of the coalition reconstruction efforts in Iraqi ports have 
been devoted to improving physical security.  In Umm Qasr, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers erected a "9.7 kilometer chain link security fence around the perimeter of 
Umm Qasr North Port and South Port," and built "19 observation posts, two points of 
entry, and interior and exterior truck staging areas."176  According to British forces 
located nearby, the 280 guards at Umm Qasr have been "reasonably well trained and 
motivated" as well as "receptive to any advice offered with regard to security 
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enhancements" from the coalition.177  In KAZ, meanwhile, the coalition built a "2 meter 
wall topped with barbed wire" around the facility, enclosing the port with only a single 
point of entry.178  Royal Navy personnel from Britain's Maritime Trade Operations office 
in Dubai (UKMTO-D) assessed in mid-2005 that both Umm Qasr and KAZ were "safe 
environments in which to work and do business."179  
 Another pillar in the effort to enhance the physical security of Iraq’s ports is the 
development of a well trained Navy and Coast Guard, capable of securing Iraqi waters 
and operating as a partner with the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Gulf.  By 2006 the new 
Iraqi Navy was composed of 10 "fast aluminum boats, each 15 feet long; five Chinese-
made patrol boats, each 40 feet long; and 10 dinghy-style boats."180  In addition to this 
small naval force, a new Iraqi Coast Guard is also standing up, with its new facility at 
Umm Qasr giving it "a secure forward operating base along the Khor Az Zubair 
waterway," vital to increasing "the level of security for both the ports of Umm Qasr and 
Khor Az Zubair."181  By June 2006, the Iraqi Navy had become "fully integrated into the 
Coalition Maritime Force," and the operational relationship with Kuwait had improved as 
well, with "Iraqi and Kuwaiti Naval and Coastguard units" participating in "monthly joint 
exercises."182  New Iraqi doctrine emphasizing a combined approach to operations is 
reflected in how the coalition protects the oil terminals.  Often described as "possibly the 
most heavily guarded pieces of economic infrastructure owned by the Iraqi government," 
ABOT and KAAOT are manned by both U.S. and Iraqi military personnel.183 
 Despite these clear improvements, the operational capabilities of the Iraqi forces 
engaged in maritime security vary.  Optimists claim that "the additional security will 
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foster prosperity and enhance the unity of the Iraqi people," and "give Iraqis the tools to 
effectively fight" enemies and illicit actors such as "oil smugglers."184  One U.S. naval 
officer even claimed that despite "challenges of training and equipment," The Iraqi navy 
is competent enough that "if we pulled out today" it "could run itself."185  The Iraqi 
forces have demonstrated competence in terms of their ability to "carry out the routine 
law enforcement chores" such as "intercepting smugglers," and combating "small-time 
pirates."186  There is evidence, however, which indicates that a great deal of illicit activity 
still occurs in Iraqi waters.  In particular, at least one Iraqi naval officer has identified 
cooperation between Iraq’s Navy and Coast Guard as a major stumbling block, claiming 
that the Ministry of Interior-controlled Coast Guard has been infiltrated by "local 
militias" complicit in smuggling.  The strained relations between the two organizations 
have led to claims that operations with Kuwait have been easier to coordinate than those 
between Iraq's sea services.187  While Iraq’s ports seem more secure now than in the 
immediate aftermath of the 2003 invasion, the full extent and success of these 
improvements in physical security remain largely unclear, particularly if they do not 
address the problems of widespread access to ports by individuals engaged in illicit 
activities. 
E. SECURITY MEASURES: ILLICIT USE OF PORTS 
 The illicit use of Iraqi ports is not a phenomenon dating from the 2003 invasion.  
Corruption and smuggling have long been fixtures in Iraq’s coastal region.  The roots of 
much of the current activity in Iraq's ports can be traced to the state-sanctioned oil 
smuggling of the nineties.  Saddam’s government helped build a "sophisticated network 
of people smuggling contraband diesel fuel and commodities nourished during the 14 
years of embargoes and UN sanctions."188  During the nineties the most important 
smuggling activity was that of crude oil illegally shipped from Iraq, directly contravening 
                                                 






post-Desert Storm UN Security Council Resolutions, with the proceeds going only to 
Saddam and his ruling clique.  Crude oil smuggling still takes place, alongside a 
burgeoning gray market in refined fuel products.  The current smuggling networks are 
dominated by a web of corrupt officials, party militias, and tribal/family/clan groups.  
The economic and security impacts on Iraq are significant, with the proceeds from the 
state's most vital resource, oil, being skimmed off for the benefit of the few, and 
government-subsidized fuel being stolen and sold for a profit before it can be used by the 
population at large.  Both forms of smuggling finance continued crime and internal 
conflict between militias and parties, as well as fueling additional competition over 
access to these state resources. 
 Smuggling of Iraqi oil is still widespread, despite the lifting of the Saddam-era 
sanctions, and the legalization of Iraqi oil exports.  As mentioned earlier, broken meters 
on ABOT and KAAOT gave smugglers opportunities to steal oil.  Shippers simply 
brought more fuel onboard than the "officially requested quantity," or produced falsified 
documents.189  At the time, loads were measured manually by with a ""dhara" – a long 
ruler inserted into the tank," a human element in the loading process which allowed 
dishonest shippers to bribe the Iraqi officials (generally affiliated with a militia or party) 
to falsify the relevant reports.190 
 Even after the repair of the meters, smugglers are still able to steal oil from other 
points within Iraq's oil export infrastructure.  The state-owned Southern Oil Company's 
"oil pipelines are regularly sabotaged and drilled into to steal crude and smuggle it 
outside Iraq."  The Oil Protection Force, an Iraqi law enforcement agency within the Oil 
Ministry, manned primarily by members of Basra governor Muhammad al-Waili's 
Fadhila Party, has been accused of directly "colluding with the smugglers" (which the 
governor has denied).191  The Basra Centre of Reconstruction, an Iraqi NGO, accused 
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Iraqi law enforcement "of facilitating smuggling operations valued at an estimated 50 
million dollars" during a two year period between 2005 and 2007.  The Oil Ministry 
denies "that large-scale smuggling is taking place in Basra," blaming inefficiencies in the 
export process on factors other than theft.  While "conceding" that 100,000 of the 1.6 
million barrels exported from Basra daily ("worth about five million dollars") "went 
missing each day," an oil ministry spokesman argued that the discrepancy resulted not 
from "smuggling but on wastage – "useless materials like water and gas that are 
contained within crude oil but are not counted as part of the total amount.""192 
 Despite these official government denials, the anecdotal claims of shippers 
indicate that crude oil smuggling is widespread and lucrative.  In one shipper's narrative 
of crude oil smuggling, he stated that "you rent an oil tanker and after your first trip you 
can buy the tanker."  The potential profits of smuggling are correlated with the potential 
risks.  Shippers claim that the price of stolen oil "depends on how far the smugglers carry 
it towards deep water, where there is more risk of being caught," with the oil ultimately 
ending up at "refineries in Yemen, the United Arab Emirates or as far as India."193 
 The smuggling of refined fuel products is also prevalent in Iraq.  Multiple factors 
drive fuel smuggling, particularly the limited capacity of Iraq's refineries, high consumer 
demand for fuel caused by the proliferation of cars on Iraq's roads, and the widespread 
use of generators by many Iraqis to supplement the state’s erratic and overwhelmed 
power system.  In response to the need for fuel, Iraq's government imports refined fuel 
products from neighboring states, and resells that fuel to the public at a heavy discount, 
providing a significant subsidy.  As of early 2007, gasoline which was then imported by 
the Iraqi state at 65 cents per liter was being officially resold at 25 cents.194  The 
differential between the subsidized price in Iraq and market prices in neighboring 
countries, coupled with an inefficient system of state distribution of fuel (it is extremely 
difficult for the average Iraqi to actually get access to that $.25/liter gas) ensures that 
black market trading in stolen or diverted fuel has flourished since 2003. 
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 This diversion of fuel occurs mainly in two ways.  Individuals with access to Iraqi 
refineries or fuel imports can take possession of fuel cargo bound for sale in Iraq on 
tanker trucks or tanker ships, and instead redirect that cargo to tankers in Iraqi ports, 
which then carry that fuel from Iraq for resale somewhere else in the region such as UAE 
or Iran, a process generally facilitated by a few well-placed bribes.195  Another common 
practice is for Iraqi fishermen to sell their government-subsidized fuel allotments to fuel 
consolidators or other vessels at sea and in need of fuel.  Iranian ships can save a great 
deal of money by bunkering with these gray-market dealers, as the Iraqi-subsidized fuel 
may be up to 100 times cheaper than that available in Iran.  Reselling their government-
issued fuel can be a much more lucrative profession for Iraqi fishermen than fishing.196  
This phenomenon can cut both ways, with reports of Iranians selling stolen or subsidized 
fuel to Iraqi mariners as well.  As of 2006 fishermen were smuggling approximately 1000 
tons of diesel per day to consolidators waiting in the gulf.197 Like crude, smuggled fuel is 
shipped throughout the region for resale.198 
 Of the 10 million liters of fuel (including gasoline, diesel, and kerosene), 
imported by Iraq daily, "between 10 per cent and 20 per cent of these legal imports will 
end up being diverted and sold on the black market," a process that hurts Iraqi consumers 
not only by limiting their access to vital commodities, but also by strengthening illicit 
distribution networks and their ability to engage in additional corruption.  One expert has 
claimed that income from smuggling, benefiting only a tiny portion of the population, has 
triggered "high inflation in Basra…with the prices of everyday products soaring and 
living conditions deteriorating for most of inhabitants."199 
 The profitability of oil smuggling and a variety of other illegal activities have 
helped to make Iraq's ports the home of all sorts of criminal activity.  Individuals and 
groups with access to the ports such as police, crane operators, and dockworkers exploit 
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those positions by taking bribes.  Despite the positive assessments of Umm Qasr’s safety 
mentioned earlier, corruption remains a significant vulnerability.  According to the Iraqi 
Port Authority's liaison with the American embassy in Baghdad, "corruption is all but 
guaranteed" at Umm Qasr.200  The ports are not valuable to Iraq’s political parties just as 
a source of graft, however.  They provide a rare source of employment in an Iraq which 
currently lacks a significant private sector economy, making port-related sinecures 
lucrative rewards for those linked to parties and militias.  One local resident claimed that 
"you can only work at the port if you join a militia."201  Despite official denials, some 
estimate that Iraqi ports employ "thousands of unnecessary workers," whose salaries 
account for a large percentage of Iraqi government waste.202  Violent crime also plagues 
Iraq's ports.  At least six murders were reported during 2006,203 which may sound like a 
small number in an Iraq wracked by all sorts of violence, but nonetheless indicates some 
conflict over control of the ports.  These "mafia-style killings" are linked to the 
"extremely lucrative oil-smuggling rackets."204 
 The Ashur are one family or tribal group that has allegedly benefited from oil 
smuggling and illicit activities in the ports.  This group, described by one journalist as "a 
small clan of about 50 families" living along the Shatt al-Arab south of Basra, allegedly 
earns "about $5m (£2.5m) a week from smuggling oil."  After low-level involvement in 
Saddam's oil smuggling apparatus as "guards at Abu Flus," the Ashur clan now possesses 
"underground oil tanks in their farms" along the river, which feed the fleet of small boats 
that deliver oil and fuel to waiting tankers in the northern Gulf.205  Due both to their 
complicity in illegal activity, and "to avoid being targeted" by Iraqi Security Forces or the 
coalition, local tribal leaders such as Ashur notables have proved to be "not reliable 
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partners in the fight against smugglers."206  In addition to driving criminal violence, 
conflict over the lucrative smuggling apparatus has encouraged the development of 
relationships between smugglers and party-affiliated militias.  The Ashur reportedly pays 
"$250,000 every week for gunmen just to make sure that we keep our terminals and 
preserve our rights."207  The riches coming from access to Basra's ports and the region’s 
maritime infrastructure virtually guarantee that they will remain a point of contention 
between Iraq's various Shia parties and their affiliated militias.  By 2007, "with literally 
billions of dollars worth of oil bypassing the national oil export system into the domestic 
and external black markets, Basra had become financially indispensable to Iraq’s Shiite 
militias."208   
 The politicization of Iraq’s maritime infrastructure has ensured that port security 
is not the primary aim of those charged with providing it.  Iraq’s ports have become a 
battlefield contested by political parties and militias as part of an intense, often violent, 
intra-Shia feud.  According to local observers, the various "Shia groups have divided up 
control of the city’s resources - including the country’s only seaport as well as its largest 
oilfields – in a precarious power arrangement which could implode at any time."209  This 
"Fadhila-SIIC-Sadr feud" over economic "fiefdoms" has become "central to the balance 
of power between vying Shiite militia groups," and has led to the "weakening" grasp by 
Baghdad over southern Iraq, while conversely cementing the control by local militias and 
factions over the region.210 
 Iraqis claim that party and militia control over oil smuggling is particularly 
pronounced.  The party-affiliated militias, after infiltrating the various security services, 
have allegedly used those powers to enrich themselves rather than protecting the state’s 
critical assets, with "police and government officials" exploiting "the lucrative oil 
smuggling business run by clans and overseen by militia groups in the southern city of 
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Basra."  Honest officials claim that police cooperate "with mafia gangs to smuggle oil," 
and that they have been prevented from arresting "gang members because of their links to 
the authorities and the militias."211  The oil smuggling infrastructure set up by Saddam in 
the nineties has been taken over by "Shia militias and their cronies,"212 who control "each 
stage of the export process," ranging "from extracting the oil from the refineries or 
terminals, to bringing it safely past the border guards and navy vessels."213 
 Among the parties who have attempted to exert their control over the Basra 
region’s resources include SIIC, whose paramilitary wing had been known as the Badr 
Corps or Badr Brigade before becoming the Badr Organization after the 2003 invasion.  
The most powerful of Iraq’s Shia parties (and one of the senior partners in Iraq’s ruling 
coalition), SIIC/Badr has been very successful at placing its members in important billets 
within Iraq’s security services, with its members particularly "influential in the 
intelligence service."  Some reports claim that SIIC personnel are the real authority in 
KAZ.214 
 Despite the presence of SIIC members and other smaller parties/militias in Iraqi 
ports, most of the conflicts there have pitted partisans of Fadhila (the Islamic Virtue 
Party) against those of the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS).  Both parties are "Sadrist" in 
the sense that they revere the legacy of Muhammad Sadeq al-Sadr (Muqtada al-Sadr’s 
grandfather).  Fadhila is led by Ayatollah Muhammad al-Yaqubi and is primarily a 
regional party with its membership concentrated in the Basra area.  Muqtada al-Sadr’s 
OMS (and its affiliated militia, Jaysh al-Mahdi or JAM) possesses a much more national 
following, with Shia residents of Baghdad its main support base (but with adherents 
spread throughout all of Iraq’s Shia communities). 
 Fadhila’s main asset has been control of the state-owned Southern Oil Company 
(SOC) by Basra governor and senior party member Muhammad al-Waili, as well as 
intermittent possession of the oil ministry in the national government, which has allowed 
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its members to infiltrate and dominate the ranks of the Oil Protection Force (OPF).215  
The stakes of Iraqi politics are high, with the governor already having deflected multiple 
attempts by rival parties and the Baghdad government to remove him from office.216  
Fadhila has used its control over the Basra government "to name its members to 
important positions," providing a local base of power.  Through its control over SOC and 
the OPF, which is "responsible for safeguarding wells, refineries, and pipelines," Fadhila 
"essentially is in charge of the oil infrastructure."  The party has also allegedly used 
control of Umm Qasr to transform the port into "the locus of all kinds of trafficking."  
Fadhila adherents are reportedly involved in every stage of the smuggling process, 
accused of "siphoning off diesel at its source, embezzling what it is supposed to monitor," 
and then supporting the "gigantic and highly sophisticated mafia, comprising smugglers, 
middlemen, accomplices within the oil ministry and so forth" which make the trafficking 
possible.217  The governor and Fadhila have faced a great deal of criticism regarding their 
handling of Iraq’s oil infrastructure, with Muqtada al-Sadr blaming them for energy 
shortages which have crippled the entire country.218  The governor rebutted that charge 
with nationalist rhetoric, labeling the allegations "a smear campaign orchestrated by pro-
Iranian parties."219 
 The Sadrists have also been accused of bearing a great deal of responsibility for 
smuggling.  They have infiltrated multiple security services, including the police force, 
the Facilities Protection Service (an agency tasked with securing infrastructure from 
within the Transportation Ministry, a cabinet post occupied by the Sadrist parties until 
their withdrawal from the governing coalition in April 2007),220 and the Basra port 
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authority.221  Abu Flus is reportedly the main port controlled by the Sadrists.222  The 
extent to which this activity is condoned by the party’s leadership is unclear.  One party 
member claimed that when meeting with Sadrist leaders in Basra, Sadr "scratched his 
nose and said mockingly, "I smell the smell of gasoline,"" thereby "accusing his own 
representatives of smuggling oil."223   
Whether smuggling is an activity directed or condoned by the party leadership, 
when coupled with Sadrist control of a "network of petrol stations" providing "staple 
commodities" like "petrol, propane, and kerosene," the Sadrists have established a 
vertically-integrated near-monopoly dominating the importation of vital commodities and 
their distribution to the consumer.224  Whether or not control of Iraq’s ports is an explicit 
strategy of these Shia parties and militias, control of Iraqi maritime infrastructure has 
proved highly lucrative for Iraqi political actors. 
 The widespread corruption of Iraqi authorities has largely pushed the 
responsibility of maritime security and law enforcement to the coalition.  Smugglers 
claim that their primary concern is "being stopped by patrolling US or British vessels," 
although they think those risks are mitigated when carrying some form of documentation, 
even if false or inaccurate, as smugglers believe that the coalition only checks to see if 
shippers are carrying "official papers," regardless of whether that paperwork is actually 
accurate.  Shippers (rightly) believe that Iraqi or Iranian authorities are much more 
susceptible to bribes than the coalition.225  Iraqi smugglers have also reportedly flown 
Iranian flags in order to use Iranian waters (off-limits to coalition, Iraqi Navy, and Iraqi 
Coast Guard vessels), with Iraqi maritime police killed or wounded by Iranians while 
chasing smugglers along the border between the two states’ territorial waters.226  Even if 
caught in the act, it is difficult for the coalition to take action against smugglers:  it is not 
necessarily clear whether fishermen selling their fuel allotments constitute an illegal act, 
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and it can also be difficult for coalition personnel to differentiate between the various 
products being sold, smuggled, or transferred at sea.  When caught, smugglers can evade 
capture by simply "leaking" or "dumping" their cargo and pretending that nothing 
untoward had happened.227 
F. ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES 
 Coalition efforts to restore Iraq’s maritime infrastructure have been quite 
successful in terms of increasing port throughput and capacity, with a significant 
investment in physical security an important part of that effort.  By 2006, "as many as 80 
ships" were offloading at Umm Qasr monthly, that amount of cargo filling "over 20,999 
trucks."  Cargo volumes have increased "across a range of commodities including 
cement, sugar, and wheat."228  Revenues also rose, with "port fees collected at Umm 
Qasr" increasing "from around $600,000 a month in late 2004 to more than $2.5 million" 
by mid-2006,229 likely reflecting a combination of increased throughput and the capacity 
of organizations entrusted with collecting the fees.  Maritime crime has even decreased, 
with 70 merchant vessels reporting criminal attacks in 2004, a number falling to 25 
between January and June 2005, and zero between January and June 2006.230 
 These impressive gains in cargo throughput and port productivity reflect a degree 
of success in rebuilding Iraq's ports and implementing some security improvements.  
Seaborne terrorism remains a threat, however.  While the coalition and Iraqi authorities 
significantly increased the size and scope of security forces deployed at the oil terminals 
after the April 2004 attack, Iraq’s maritime infrastructure still has vulnerabilities not 
addressed by having more men guarding ports and more ships patrolling in the vicinity of 
the oil platforms.  The potential economic cost of a future attack is daunting.  "War risk 
insurance" for vessels calling in Iraq increased from $35,000 to $140,000 after the ABOT 
attack.231  While not on the same scale as that attack, a relatively low-risk attack by 
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RPGs or mortars could "wreck" a port such as Umm Qasr’s "commercial viability" if 
shippers decide that the benefits of their currently profitable Iraq routes are outweighed 
by the potential danger and costs associated with violence in the ports.232  All the 
available data indicates that maritime traffic to Iraq did not decrease after the ABOT 
attack, in spite of those high insurance costs, although it is unclear whether that continued 
maritime traffic resulted from confidence in the coalition's ability to guard Iraqi 
infrastructure, or the handsome profits to be gained from shipping to Iraq, regardless of 
the security environment.  While militia dominance of the region's security services seem 
to make such an attack on maritime infrastructure currently unlikely (there is no incentive 
to destroy something that they are profiting from), continued conflict between those 
groups means that such an attack could be a possibility if the militia balance of power 
shifts. 
 The reconstruction of Iraq's ports is not a straightforward narrative of increased 
state or coalition control of maritime infrastructure, resulting in increased productivity 
and throughput.  Previous efforts to regulate trade have impacted the flow of goods into 
Iraq.  Prior to mid-2004, a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)-mandated 
"reconstruction levy" was collected at sea by the coalition for ships bound to Umm Qasr 
and KAZ.  This tax gave many ships an incentive to offload their cargoes at then-
unregulated Abu Flus, thus saving money (by avoiding the levy) and time (by avoiding 
coalition boarding of their vessels).  That phenomenon ceased only after authorities 
began to enforce the levy against ships bound for Abu Flus as well, and then secured the 
jetties outside the actual Abu Flus facility that shippers had been using to illegally offload 
to avoid the fees.233  Much of the current illicit behavior, particularly fuel smuggling, is 
driven by similar financial calculations.  Fuel is stolen or diverted and then resold 
because of an artificially imposed price differential maintained by the state.  As long as 
profits can be made trafficking fuel, groups such as the militias or criminal syndicates 
will fight over access to the lucrative maritime infrastructure.   
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 Clearly the productivity of Iraq’s ports has soared since the 2003 invasion, but 
this has largely been driven by demand for consumer goods after Iraq’s long economic 
isolation, and the large investment of reconstruction dollars by the coalition.  The 
coalition has borne the costs of reconstruction, and traffic through the ports has been 
brisk enough that productivity has been high despite the healthy cut taken by the militias 
in the form of smuggled oil and corruption.  While the coalition and Iraqis seem to have 
addressed the security vulnerabilities associated with an attack such as that on ABOT, the 
continued prevalence of smuggling, corruption, and militia infiltration may threaten that 
security in the long run.  They may present opportunities for future attacks, and also 
degrade the operating environment in Iraq's ports, scaring away less risk-averse shippers. 
G. CONCLUSION 
 Port Security improvements in Iraq differ primarily from the states previously 
examined because they have occurred in the context of reconstruction (by the invaders) 
of national infrastructure.  Unlike Saudi Arabia and UAE, Iraq's ports are not ISPS-
compliant.  Although the American Embassy has declared ISPS-certification an 
important goal, the coalition's first task has been to get the ports running, not to conform 
to international norms of maritime security.  While the Saudis and Emiratis have been 
able to devote significant sums of money to the project of port security, much of the 
financial burden that would have been associated with implementing security measures in 
Iraq has instead been borne by the occupiers. The current security situation, in which 
armed Shia militias and security forces dominate the Basra region, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
forces have been significantly weakened throughout Iraq, does not seem to favor attacks 
by Sunni jihadists against maritime infrastructure.  However, militia dominance of the 
security forces, and instability resulting from the associated corruption, crime, and intra-
Shia conflict, may make maritime infrastructure an attractive target for one of those 
groups if their conflict intensifies.   
 Iraq's ports are thriving, with throughput and productivity increasing since they 
were reopened after the invasion.  It is unlikely that this is the sole result of better port 
security.  Iraq was effectively cut off from the global economy by over twenty years of 
war and sanctions, and currently robust consumer demand may have proved incentive 
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enough to induce shippers to ferry goods to post-war Iraq.  Thriving ports seem to 
indicate that coalition and Iraqi attempts to implement stricter port security measures 
have not deterred a significant number of shippers from making that journey.   
Because reconstruction efforts in Iraq's ports are still relatively new, there has 
been little effort to implement more stringent standards and practices to improve the 
verification of identities and credentials, or increase the security of cargo or the supply 
chain.  The coalition has invested heavily in improving physical security, essentially 
fortifying Umm Qasr and KAZ, and attempting to establish and train effective maritime 
security forces.  The small Iraqi Navy seems to be on a path towards operational 
effectiveness, and its interoperability with the coalition and Iraq's neighbors is an 
indicator of increasing capability.  The ability of the other security forces remains a 
concern.  They will continue to present the most significant maritime vulnerability in Iraq 
if they continue to function primarily as a fundraising arm for their affiliated political 
parties, or as partners of criminal organizations.  While they may not present the classic 
terrorist vulnerability, as Iraq's ports seem quite productive even in light of their 
depredations, they present significant risks to Iraq's maritime infrastructure, economy, 
and security. 
 68
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 69
V. CONCLUSION 
A. IDENTITY AND CREDENTIAL VERIFICATION 
 Neither Saudi Arabia, UAE, or Iraq has devoted significant resources after 2001 
to developing a comprehensive solution to the problem of providing a secure uniform 
credential to individuals with legitimate access to a port facility.  A program such as 
UAE's new national identification card system, or the numerous checkpoints that stand 
between a potential terrorist and a maritime target in Saudi Arabia, may enhance security 
but do not provide a comprehensive system preventing illicit access to critical port 
infrastructure from both land and sea.  These states have not signed the Revised 
Seafarer's Identity Documents Convention.  Preventing terrorists or other illicit actors 
from accessing ports will require these states to rigorously enforce their relevant 
immigration rules regarding the entry of merchant seamen and passengers into the state 
via maritime ports of entry, as well as the operators of ports to properly vet all individuals 
working or accessing ports via land. 
B. SUPPLY CHAIN AND CARGO SECURITY 
Much of the global efforts toward enhancing port security globally have involved 
efforts to inspect container cargo.  Containers have long proved their worth to smugglers 
as a method to move all sorts of illicit cargo.  Rigorous inspection of container cargo is an 
important element of effective port security, and Dubai's involvement in CSI signals a 
desire to implement stringent, globally recognized security practices.  The current 
program of targeted scanning of suspect containers is flawed, however.  Enforcement 
agencies do not have the equipment or time to inspect all containers.  Even the most 
robust algorithm designed to identify containers most likely to hold illicit cargo will not 
be foolproof.  The tools used by customs officials to scan containers are also imperfect, 
and incapable of identifying a variety of illicit cargo, including "shielded" radioactive 
materials.  It is somewhat ironic that it may be easy to hide radioactive material in a 
container, because the perceived threat from such a scenario has focused much of the 
emphasis within the realm of port security on the inspection of containers.  It may be 
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worthwhile to devote a disproportionate amount of limited port security resources to the 
container problem if one is truly concerned with the threat posed by illicit shipment of 
radiological materials, thereby ignoring potential threats associated with non-container 
shipping, illicit access to ports, and flawed physical security.  However, when the 
measures used to inspect containers do not accomplish their tasks, then a container-
centric approach to providing effective port security has failed. 
C. PHYSICAL SECURITY 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iraq have invested heavily in improving the physical 
security measures of their ports.  These states and the firms operating ports within them 
have found it relatively easy to justify and spend potentially billions of dollars to build 
stronger fences, install sensors, and employ large security forces devoted to protecting 
port facilities.  It is clear that these efforts fail to provide comprehensive protection for 
ports, however.  Saudi Arabia's massive expenditures on physical security may be 
undermined by the potential that AQ militants or sympathizers have or will infiltrate 
either security forces designed to protect coastal infrastructure, or the industries 
associated with maintaining that coastal infrastructure.  The extent to which stories of AQ 
infiltration of the oil industry or security forces are true will be key in determining 
whether enhanced physical security measures in Saudi Arabia prove effective.  UAE has 
made similar efforts to build stronger security for its ports, and the practices employed by 
industry leaders such as DP World may be the finest in the world.  However, the extent to 
which similar protection is provided in the smaller dhow ports may create vulnerable 
ports which are close to and provide access to the larger ports involved in global trade.  
The coalition and the Iraqi government have made physical security in the ports an 
important cornerstone of their reconstruction program.  The development of large and 
competent security forces are another important element in that effort.  Currently, 
however, there are many concerns regarding the allegiance and professionalism of many 
of the Iraqi security forces charged with protecting Iraqi ports, concerns that may be 
exacerbated following any potential pull-out or drawdown of coalition forces. 
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D. ILLICIT USE OF PORTS 
If illicit actors have easy access to ports, then programs designed to protect a port 
may prove worthless.  UAE has long been a smuggler's haven, with widespread 
involvement in the sale of black or gray market oil and fuel from Iraq one manifestation 
of that activity.  Its residents and citizens have made it a significant source of funds for 
AQ, while its relatively lax financial regulations have made it a favored location for the 
laundering of money.  However, it is also increasingly a surveillance state, and has 
demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in the case of Nashiri.  Building a 
laissez-faire business and tourist paradise may conflict with some of the freewheeling 
practices of the past, but in many ways, it is precisely those practices that have made the 
Emirates such a desirable destination for business, legitimate or illicit.  The extent to 
which UAE can clamp down on smuggling will involve a re-articulation of many of those 
principles.  It remains to be seen whether the international jet-set can harmoniously exist 
side by side with dhow-borne smuggling networks, but the extent to which they do will 
demonstrate UAE's response to this problem.  Iraq's dilemma is simpler.  The ports are 
dominated by security forces that have been infiltrated by militias and political parties.  
While they have proven relatively effective in protecting Iraq's ports to date, this has 
probably been more because securing the ports is in the financial interests of their party 
or militia to do so, not because they have been charged with those tasks by the Iraqi state.  
If and when the interests of the parties do not coincide with the mission of port security, 
Iraq's ports may prove quite vulnerable.    
E. ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES 
ISPS compliance has not proved a difficult burden for Saudi Arabia and UAE.  
Although Iraq's ports have yet to comply with the code, the Iraqi government and 
occupying coalition have declared that compliance is desirable and an important element 
in the state's overall reconstruction program.  Dubai's involvement in CSI reflects a 
similar view that involvement in international port security programs are not necessarily a 
burden imposed by the international community, but a desirable, potentially lucrative, 
symbol of inclusion in the international system.  In fact, none of the data measuring trade 
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through the ports of these three case studies indicates any discernable negative impacts 
associated with the implementation of stricter security measures.  While there may have 
been onerous costs associated with implementation, it has been impossible to identify 
those burdens in light of widespread increases in port throughput.  Iraq, the only state yet 
to implement ISPS, has also experienced increased port throughput.  The Iraqi case seems 
to demonstrate the potential for profits is incentive enough for shippers to trade in 
countries regardless of the security situation, at least up to a point. 
Compliance may also represent the widespread acknowledgement of the potential 
impacts associated with maritime terrorism, particularly acts targeted against energy 
infrastructure.  While this thesis has identified numerous vulnerabilities unaddressed by 
these states' response to ISPS and a worldwide drive to improve port security, there has 
only been one maritime or seaborne terrorist attack in the Persian Gulf since 2001, the 
2004 attack on ABOT, which failed to actually strike the intended target.  While there 
have been suspected plots in Saudi Arabia, and Nashiri was arrested after planning a 
potential seaborne attack in UAE, the reason for this lack of terrorist activity is unclear. 
Investment in port security may have resulted in regional ports possessing the capability 
to prevent and protect against attacks, terrorists may not be interested in striking at 
maritime targets at all (despite Usama bin-Laden's endorsement of attacks on maritime 
oil infrastructure), or terrorists just may not currently possess the necessary maritime 
expertise and are simply biding their time until they do.  The actual answer to this 
question remains unknown, but the current system, dating from the 2004 implementation 
of ISPS, provides multiple vulnerabilities that terrorists can possibly exploit. 
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